House of Marathon

AirSea Battle As Presently Conceived

2011-12-31T12:41:00.000-08:00

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In mid-December, a senior U.S. Navy official delivered a (not for attribution) presentation on the AirSea Battle concept at a Washington D.C. institute. While AirSea Battle was first introduced in early 2010(1), official Department of Defense explanations of the concept have been minimal. In the absence of a comprehensive DOD summary, the void has been filled by service publications, defense media, and online journals. To date, the principal reference point has been two monographs published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, "Why AirSea Battle?" (02/19/2010) and "AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept" (05/18/2010). Aviation Week produced a comprehensive overview in April 2011. By contrast, DOD acknowledged the Aug. 12 establishment of an “AirSea Battle Office” composed of 12 to 15 officers -- after the fact on November 9th. Defense media coverage ranged from objective to underwhelmed. The week prior to the presentation, Inside the Pentagon obtained a unsigned copy of a new Joint Staff publication entitled “Joint Operational Access Concept”. In all, the dearth of information is surprising given previous Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s depiction of AirSea Battle as a concept with “potential to do for America’s military deterrent power at the beginning of the 21st century what AirLand Battle did near the end of the 20th.” As such, the December briefing provided a welcome introduction to AirSea Battle -- the presentation focused principally on its historical antecedents but it also succinctly summarized how the concept is expected to address current operational challenges associated with power projection. AirSea Battle, as currently conceived, represents a substantive (embryonic) attempt to address anti-access and area denial, but, as with many attempts by civilian and military department leaders, it be may be hindered by the paucity of guidance from elected decision-makers as to America’s national security objectives going forward.

The Core of AirSea Battle

At its heart, AirSea Battle is anticipated to be the basis for “winning a guided munitions salvo competition.” The key aim is “to disrupt and destroy enemy A2-AD networks and their defensive and offensive guided weapons systems in order to enable U.S. freedom of action to conduct concurrent and follow-on operations.” Winning is accomplished by employing both kinetic and non-kinetic means and by scouting the enemy’s network, attacking effectively first, and coordinating operations and fires across dispersed forces.

The presenting official came to this summation by demonstrating how warfare has evolved from engagements between forces wielding massive unguided munitions. Whether thrown, shot, fired, or dropped, effective unguided munitions had to be delivered in mass to compensate for the low probability of striking the designated target.

Warfare began to transition away purely unguided munitions engagements during World War II when forces began fielding “battle networks” to sense enemy attacks earlier and coordinate defensive measures more quickly. Guided munitions made their appearance in the form of Imperial Japanese kamikaze attacks in the Pacific theater. The tactic fared well as a strategem to overcome American networked defenses (and contrasted positively with massive American naval fires) demonstrating guided munitions could achieve comparable effects more efficiently, especially if delivered first.

The breakthrough, however, was underappreciated as the coinciding development and use of the atomic bomb demonstrated how a single munition’s explosive capacity could dwarf an entire arsenal’s firepower and eliminate the problem of missing the target. Instead of comprehensively exploring the potential of guided munitions, the American military established nuclear weapons as the basis for its offensive arsenal; the development of guided munitions occurred primarily only as part of integrated and computerized network defense systems.

The next catalyst to prompt the U.S. military to begin developing offensive guided munitions was the Vietnam War. American reliance on unguided munitions had two shortcomings. One, North Vietnamese air defenses employed guided missiles increasing the risk to American pilots loitering at length in order to discharge unguided bombs. Two, indiscriminate bombing campaigns resulted in massive civilian deaths, diminishing support for the American war effort domestically and abroad. The operational performance of guided munitions led the Department of Defense to launch in 1975 after the war’s end the Long Range Research and Development Planning Program. The priority was to provide American decision-makers with an alternative to choosing “massive nuclear destruction” as a course of action; as the path not yet taken, the Department would develop guided munition capabilities.

Initial progress was uneven as the main munitions-dependent services, the Navy and the Air Force, focused on service-specific tactical objectives, namely countering air and maritime platforms. Moreover, technology had not yet overcome limitations connected with the nature of delivery systems (carrier magazines, carrier-based air forces) or weather (laser-impeding clouds).

In the end, the decisive factor was the continuing competition with the USSR. Soviet military theorists, led by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, readily recognized command and control systems networked via computer systems and armed with guided munitions could usher in a “military technical revolution” in warfare. Faced with a potential Soviet “reconnaissance-strike complex,” the American military responded by beginning to examine full how campaign planning and execution could capitalize on capitalize on guided munitions (as well as digital networks). Meanwhile, technology finally advanced whereby new munitions would be less costly and more precise. Doctrinal application occurred with the formulation of AirLand Battle.

Operational validation occurred in the victory over Iraq in 1991. After Operation Desert Storm, “the defining battle” in the words of the presentation, relying principally on unguided munitions would have been inconceivable for any of the services. As successive charts demonstrated, the American reliance on guided munitions increased in volume, proportion, and precision over the time period leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

For American adversaries, the only conventional countermeasures available at the time entailed denying American battle networks the information needed to execute strikes (deception, jamming) or mitigating the effect of executed strikes (moving assets below the surface or hiding among the civilian population). Adversaries could seek nuclear weapons but not without a substantial commitment of resources and inevitable attention from the United States.

While American military dominance was assured during this period, the advantage would ultimately be fleeting. Invariably, the underlying technology spread and adversaries -- state and non-state -- have developed or acquired commensurate capabilities and are prepared to deny the American military the freedom of action to which it has been accustomed. Referring to slide 26, the presenting official noted how the cumulative effect of layered SAM, fighter, ship, and missile assets would curtail the maneuver space for American forces.

It is in this context the presenting official returned to the opening premise of AirSea Battle as a means for assuring American power projection in an era of guided munitions.

If Adversary X (and the presenting official repeatedly stressed the concept is not premised on a specific country) employs anti-access area denial measures, then AirSea Battle will have shaped operational planning and resulted in capabilities whereby American forces can neutralize the enemy’s network and attack first. By first defeating an enemy’s targeting capabilities and delivery systems (as well as demonstrating the ability to mitigate or sustain a strike), the United States will retain the requisite operational freedom of action. “Air Sea Battle will soon be a necessary precursor before deploying the remainder of the joint force.”

American decision-makers concerned anti-access and area denial measures would thwart deployed forces or allies worried the United States would not contest such measures would be assuaged.

In this regard, winning the guided munition salvo competition is ultimately about deterring adversaries and re-assuring allies.

The presenting official acknowledged the concept principally remains a joint Navy-Air Force endeavor but speculated a successful AirSea Battle concept could prompt exploration of a successor ground force doctrine -- an “AirLand Battle II.” The presenting official commented the Marine Corps would be the “bridge” for the eventual incorporation of the Army; whether this incorporation would be into ensuing conceptual development or (later) operational planning was not explained.

Critical to the success of AirSea Battle is “scouting” whereby American forces have successfully established the scope and scale of the enemy’s battle network. The presenting official indicated intelligence would be integral to successful scouting and made a brief (but unintentionally) pointed reference to network operational capability. Whether this signifies the use of indigenous service capabilities or the newly established Cyber Command is unknown.

In discussing new platforms and weapons, the presenting officials stated the Department must sustain its investment in directed energy and electronic warfare -- otherwise, the American military will be at a distinct disadvantage in the future.

In discussing present assets, the presenting official asserted the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program is proceeding satisfactorily(2) and stated it will provide capabilities consistent with AirSea Battle as currently conceived. Moreover, the presenting official contended the aircraft would be purchased by allies throughout the region, providing a complementarity that is rarely available.(3)
AirSea Battle as a Joust?

If a future operational challenge will entail overcoming anti-access and area denial measures via the employment of guided munitions, then AirSea Battle’s focus on neutralizing the enemy’s battle network and striking first with long range guided munitions appears appropriate -- if it indeed can be accomplished. Each side will still be holding the other at bay with an integrated battle network and guided munitions, just as the Soviets had contemplated earlier (see below top). Revisiting the Soviet rendition, one is possibly reminded of the medieval joust (see below bottom). Two opponents, each armed with “long-range” weapons and each trying to exploit very narrow margins for victory.

In this context, AirSea Battle presupposes a parity between the American military and an enemy’s military (even though little evidence suggests parity indeed exists). Again, the Soviets realized the incorporation of precision weaponry would expand the battlespace and assumed the United States was moving in the same direction. Developing an equivalent reconnaissance-strike complex would have been their attempt to deter an anticipated American advantage.

Accordingly, a face-off between opponents with integrated battle network and guided munitions is an instance of mutual deterrence. AirSea Battle seeks to resolve this standoff by placing a tremendous premium on defensive measures and sustaining superior maneuverability and speed. If a future operational challenge will entail overcoming anti-access and area denial measures, then AirSea Battle’s focus on neutralizing the enemy’s battle network and striking first with long range guided munitions appears appropriate -- if it indeed can be accomplished.(4)

As depicted by the presentation, the Soviets conceived of the reconnaissance-strike complex as a maritime application. The Americans, in contrast, developed its complex to support ground operations in Europe. At that time, the technology supported only short range combined ground and air operations in a confined geographic space. In the present, the Department of Defense will need to develop and procure long-range systems and, emphatic disclaimers aside, the expected battlespace will adversaries along the combined enormity of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, more than 86 million square miles and approximately 126,000 miles of coastline (WolframAlpha, see below).

The corresponding number of targets and platform requirements may dwarf what can be attained in the near to medium future. As Mr. Robert Haddick of Small Wars Journal has pointed out in recent articles, the current configuration of forces in the Western Pacific may simply preclude a quick resolution of any engagement. Moreover, the military services will have to accept inevitable “large cultural changes” if its members are to accomplish the tall tasks laid out in AirSea Battle, whether it is operating new remotely-piloted long-range systems or synchronizing previously independent planning and programming.

Warning of inevitable cultural changes and expecting adaptation by the warfighter brings to mind (again) the admonition of Air Force COL John Boyd: “Machines don’t fight wars, people do, and they use their minds.” The warfighter should not have to adjust to accommodate organizational integration or anticipated platforms -- organization and platforms should.

The Imperative of Broader Structural Restructuring

AirSea Battle is a laudable attempt to address a nettlesome operational challenge, but amidst severe budgetary challenges and the continuing need for reform, the concept should be concomitant with a broader restructuring of American forces.

In a recent Joint Force Quarterly article, retired U.S. Army COL Doug MacGregor outlined force design options warranting additional attention.

In line with the premium placed on maneuver and speed arising from the above salvo competition, COL MacGregor calls for a force structured and equipped for dispersed mobile warfare inside an integrated maneuver-strike-intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR)-sustainment complex that combines ground maneuver forces with strike, ISR, and sustainment capabilities from all of the services. In COL MacGregor's estimation, military establishments that integrate functions and capabilities across service lines while simultaneously eliminating unneeded overhead not only are less expensive to operate and maintain, but are also likely to be far more lethal.

Again, the US military should be inspired by its former Soviet foe and similarly establish a unified military command structure that compels the integration of core service capabilities under a single operational commander, which permitted the maximization combat power (land, sea, and air) where it was needed and minimization where it was not needed. Accordingly, a future force would combine strike and maneuver into a single joint operation inside a joint task force command under a lieutenant general or vice admiral. Subordinate commanding major generals would separately be responsible for maneuver, strike, sustainment, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Additionally, COL MacGregor recommends establishing a new self-contained mission-focused capability package -- a Combat Maneuver Group (CMG) of 5,000- to 6,000-man under the command of a brigadier general and capable of limited independent action that “eliminates unnecessary command levels and drives jointness to a much lower level.” In the aggregate, the future force would feature reduced command overhead(5) combining with existing single-service echelons transitioned into a flatter, multi-service integrative structure to maximize ready and deployable combat power.

Beyond Structural Reform -- Defining Red Lines

COL MacGregor’s recommendations center principally on ground forces and he contends sea control is no longer a mission demanding a large surface fleet. To ensure access in the same battlespace AirSea Battle is being designed to address, the United States should instead rely on a nuclear submarine fleet employing long-range sensors, manned and unmanned aircraft, communications, and missiles.

The emphasis reflects a final matter AirSea Battle does not address and, admittedly, probably should not have to address. AirSea Battle is a means for militarily contesting impeded access but whether it will be sufficiently decisive is (again) unknown; does its conception imply a readiness on the part of the elected national decision-makers to proceed up the escalatory ladder?

Returning to the likely battlespace and, by extension, supposable adversaries in the form of China and Iran, have decision-makers clearly laid out the national interest and what constitute the basis for war?

Is China’s pursuit of increased flexibility in the western Pacific Ocean a critical threat to American interests? If the matter is the forcible re-unification of Taiwan, yes; if the matter is increasing naval capabilities to preclude reliance on a foreign power’s navy to safeguard its burgeoning maritime trade interests, then perhaps not. (Moreover, the guided munition salvo competition is going to occur over the territory of critical American allies like Japan -- have decision-makers broached the matter?)

Is Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons a critical threat to American interests? Yes, but has the continued absence of diplomatic and trade relations and sole reliance on military posturing facilitated American objectives? The past decade in Afghanistan and Iraq has demonstrated the limitations of applying principally military forces and resources to American foreign policy challenges. Although reductions must occur in the Department of Defense budget, decision-makers will still have to retain a modicum of diplomatic and intelligence capacity to compensate for the retreat of “military forward” presence; hopefully not all budget reductions will be reserved for deficit reduction.

In closing, AirSea Battle is a laudable attempt to address the continuing challenge of the asymmetric approaches an adversary will undertake to undermine U.S. objectives. Nonetheless, effective employment of this concept may deter would be adversaries and assure allies, but guidance at the presidential level must be forthcoming to answer how the nation proceeds should such circumstances prove short-lived.

Footnotes
1 The AirSea Battle concept made its official debut in February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. It was identified as the means for defining how air and naval forces would “integrate capabilities across all operational domains” and “guide the development of future capabilities needed” for deterring and defeating aggression in anti-access environments, a key element to “rebalance the force.”

2 The assertion was untimely as it came amidst the release of an internal Department of Defense report detailing significant problems in the program (Source: Project On Government Oversight: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Concurrency Quick Look Review (URL))

3 Japan recently decided to acquire the aircraft for its air force.

4 Whether the Soviets ever figured out to triumph in the collision of reconnaissance-strike complexes is unknown -- they never had the chance. Moreover, after the Soviet collapse, reconnaissance-strike complexes have only been employed against significantly inferior opponents.

5 COL MacGregor recommends reducing the number of geographic combatant commands to four; as previously submitted, the number of geographic combatant commands could alternatively be reduced to two.

Looking To Run Against Barack Hussein Walker Bush

2011-11-20T17:35:00.001-08:00

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Observing the disarray that is the party's field of presidential candidates, Republicans have attempted to console themselves by comparing Romney, Perry, and company to the Democratic field of 1992 that ended up in a surprising victory for Arkansas Governor William Jefferson Clinton. Just like the Democratic Party in 1992, the Republican field is devoid of a frontrunner. Just like Democratic primary voters in 1992, Republicans are reluctant to commit. However, for Republicans, the silver lining is that the field of second-tier Democratic forgettables in 1992 produced the two-term Clinton Administration. Surely the still fluid Republican race can similarly serve up a nominee capable of unseating incumbent President Barack Obama...

Revisiting 1992

By 1992, after three consecutive losses (by substantial margins), becoming the Democratic Party presidential nominee had seemingly become an exhibition of political masochism.

In 1980, President James Carter became the first incumbent voted out of office since Herbert Hoover in 1932. In 1984, so many traditional Democratic voters forsook Walter Mondale that history now remembers them as “Reagan Democrats.” In 1988, Michael Dukakis blew a seventeen-point lead. Two years into the Bush 41 presidency, few respected Democratic powerhouses would signal their interest.

By December 1990, the race was so wide open even George McGovern, the loser of forty-nine states to one in 1972, admitted he was seriously thinking about running. The first serious Democratic candidate -- former Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas, a self-described “pro-business liberal,” hadn’t been in office since 1985 after serving only one term -- announced in April 1991.

By the end of the year, a field of contenders eventually emerged consisting of Iowa Senator Tom Harkin, Nebraska Senator Robert Kerrey, former Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder, Tsongas, Jerry Brown, and Clinton. Brown was the mercurial former California “Governor Moonbeam,” who last ran for president in 1980 and had left office in 1982.

Clinton was considered a riser given his youth, charisma, thoughtfulness on policy, and work to update Democratic liberalism after the 1984 debacle through the Democratic Leadership Council. Unfortunately, his overly long nominating speech at the 1988 convention diminished enthusiasm for him.

Harkin’s bid led candidates to skip the Iowa caucuses and instead focus attention on the New Hampshire primary, where Clinton was leading Tsongas until his campaign faced explosive allegations of infidelity and draft dodging. Party establishment figures were so despondent the primary would be inconclusive that they considered drafting Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen as late as February 16 -- just two days before the vote.

Clinton came in second but characterized the unexpected second-place finish as a victory and christened himself the Comeback Kid. Tsongas and Brown stayed in a little longer, until Clinton swept the Super Tuesday states, predominantly held in his native South. Nonetheless, Clinton limped across the finish line, arriving at the Democratic Convention and polling third behind Bush and independent H. Ross Perot.

The Democratic Convention ended up being a turning point as the event successfully reintroduced Clinton to the country and coincided with Perot’s withdrawal from the race. Clinton eventually won in November -- but he received only a plurality of the popular vote.

Why so few first-tier names declined to make the race is no mystery. Bush 41 proved a historic commander-in-chief, leading a global coalition against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and securing a decisive military victory in the Persian Gulf War. Amidst a sluggish economy, Bush was rewarded with stratospherically high approval ratings -- 91 percent. Most Democratic luminaries opposed the Bush Administration and those who didn’t concluded Bush would be unbeatable.

Only after Bush’s poll numbers fell into the forties did Clinton and others join the race -- a convenience Tsongas derided as “a courage gap of fifty percent.”

Fast Forward to 2012

Today’s Republican hopefuls don’t lack for courage, but they are certainly desperate for affection. “Weak frontrunner” has been permanently affixed to Mitt Romney’s name as he has been completely unable to break 20 percent in polling. Meanwhile, Republican voters have cycling through Romney alternatives at a frenetic pace.

Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty never gained traction and dropped out after placing behind tea party favorite Rep. Michele Bachmann at the Ames Iowa straw poll. Then major party donors persuaded Texas Gov. Rick Perry to enter the race. Perry quickly supplanted Bachmann only to decline just as rapidly after successive stumbles on nationally televised debates. Major party donors mobilized again, this time trying to recruit New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie, who eventually declined. Businessman Herman Cain gained ground at Perry’s expense by promoting a radical plan to overhaul the tax system, but has now withered in the face of sexual harassment claims (and easy questions on foreign policy).

In his wake, former Speaker Newt Gingrich, once dismissed as finished, has begun surging. Current polling (11/17/11) has Gingrich tied with Romney for the lead, but his former employers (the health care industry, Freddie Mac) will definitely come back to haunt him.

Clinton's resilience eclipsed his (many) flaws and inevitably won over his party and the public -- maybe Romney's discipline (or Gingrich’s persistence) will achieve the same.

Perils of the Past as Prologue

However, the comparison only works if Obama runs as inept a re-election campaign as then President George H.W. Bush, which is a remote likelihood. Obama has already raised $88 million and observers are predicting he's prepared to drop "hope and change" in favor of "fear and loathing."

Then again, if one parallel is not enough, then perhaps a second similarity makes the case more persuasive. Unlike Bush 41, Obama has not had to deal with a primary challenge, but like Bush 41, he is approaching his level of success as a commander-in-chief.

Since spring of this year, Obama has amassed an impressive collection of international rogues’ scalps. Obama took out Osama bin Laden in May -- and can be commended for choosing the riskiest option, a covert raid, when he decided to do so. The administration’s unrestricted drone warfare policy lucked out with a strike on a convoy in Yemen that included Anwar al-Awlaki. Obama and allies just knocked off Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi. Obama hasn’t benefited approval rating-wise, but these successes could mitigate attacks on his foreign policy, a perennial Democratic Achilles’ Heel.

With the presidential part of the 1992 analogy falling into place, the Republican contenders may indeed have history on their side.

...Of course, fortune smiled only on Clinton, not the Democratic Party that reluctantly embraced him. Only two years after he won, Democrats lost the Senate and its forty-year old House majority and stayed in the congressional minority for the next twelve years...

The Drone Delusion

2011-10-01T09:04:00.000-07:00

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"[Drone] Air strikes have been the single most effective tool at protecting the American people from core al-Qaeda and other organizations."

Michael E. Leiter, former Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, The National Conversation--9/11: The Next Ten Years, The Woodrow Wilson Center, September 12, 2011

Drones are emblematic of America's reliance on advanced technology in warfare and have become the principal instrument in the nation's fight against terrorists. While unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology is a few decades old, they have become indispensable to American military operations. The manpower-intensive nature of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have increased the requirement for the unique intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities provided by drones by several orders of magnitude in just under a decade. Moreover, armed drone strikes have become central to American counter-terrorist operations in Afghanistan-Pakistan. In the parlance of national security practitioners, drones constitute an "asymmetric" advantage for the United States -- a unique means of warfare available primarily to one side in a conflict. Indeed, the success achieved by drone strikes, in tandem with the American surge in Afghanistan and the killing of Osama bin Laden in July 2011, have convinced national decision-makers that Al Qaeda is within "strategic defeat." The conviction would be welcome if it was indeed based on more than the impressive technological of remotely piloted vehicles. As many practitioners will caveat, the enemy has a vote, and in the face of overwhelming American military strength, it will readily employ its own asymmetric advantages. When American drones are contrasted with enemy stratagems, the alleged advantage evaporates. Ascribing strategic advantage to drones exaggerates their effectiveness and obscures needed changes in the way the United States approaches contemporary security challenges.

Asymmetry vs. Asymmetry

In response to American advanced military technology, the enemy introduced two decidedly low-tech measures -- suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices.

Suicide attacks have been a critical tactic in insurgents' and terrorists' playbooks since the 1980s. Once the innovation of Tamil rebels on Sri Lanka, the tactic spread to the Middle East as terrorist groups began to conduct suicide bombings in their bid to eject Israel from Lebanon and Palestinian territories. The Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, marked the most deadly suicide attack in history, resulting in almost 3,000 deaths. Following the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the number of suicide attacks grew enormously in both countries. According to the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST), the number of suicide attacks from 1981 to 2009 around the globe totaled 1,941, from which over 25,000 died and almost 66,000 were wounded; attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2002 to 2009 accounted for 1,279 of those attacks, or 66 percent, and just under 14,000 dead, or just more than 50 percent.

Improvised explosive devices are simply just that - munitions cobbled together from available materials. IEDs are usually deployed inconspicuously and detonated by wires, pressure, or remote control. The explosion can be a standalone attack, a diversionary tactic, or part of a coordinated ambush. The device could also be delivered by car or truck. According to iCasualties.org, an independent website that tracks casualties in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the number of IED-related fatalities totaled 395 in 2011, 51 percent of all fatalities.

Official data on U.S. drone strikes globally are classified. As such, the New America Foundation, a non-partisan think tank, has completed an ongoing analysis of drone strikes in Pakistan for the period 2004-2011. According to New America Foundation research, 270 reported drone strikes in northwest Pakistan, including 57 in 2011, from 2004 to the present have killed approximately between 1,661 and 2,601 individuals, of whom around 1,368 to 2,130 were described as militants in reliable press accounts. (For additional information on the New America Foundation "Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2011", proceed to http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones.)

The linked chart depicting the number of fatalities year in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater resulting from the enemy's use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), enemy suicide attacks, and U.S. drone strikes for the period 2004-2011.1
As the chart indicates, the enemy's use of IEDs and suicide attacks (against the U.S. and allies) in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater have wreaked far more damage in terms of fatalities than U.S. drone strikes -- 8,030 vs. 2,031 even without suicide attack data for 2010 and 2011.

While relying on body counts as a metric was discredited during the Vietnam War, the contrast underscores the impact of the chosen tactic. U.S. drone strikes have indeed increased in use over the years and high-ranking terrorist leaders have been eliminated, but their use has lagged far behind the enemy's use of suicide attacks, which the enemy employed earlier, more lethally, and, in strategic terms, to greater effect.

"Like the British and the Russians before them…"

After all, President Barack Obama announced in June 2011 that American forces would be exiting Afghanistan in September 2012, closing out the surge he commenced in December 2009. According to the plan presented then, the overarching goal would be "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future." To achieve this objective -- over the next eighteen months -- President Obama outlined three steps. The first two steps toward achieving this objective entailed "break[ing] the Taliban's momentum" and "pursu[ing] a more effective civilian strategy."

According to September 2, 2011 reporting by David Ignatius of the Washington Post, a July 2011 Central Intelligence Agency report entitled "District Assessment on Afghanistan" asserted the war was heading toward a stalemate. "Even in areas where the United States has surged troops over the past 18 months to clear insurgents, the CIA analysts weren’t optimistic that the Taliban’s momentum had been reversed, as President Obama and his military commanders have argued." On September 20, 2011, the Taliban capped a series of audacious attacks with the suicide attack assassination of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was leading peace and reconciliation negotiations.

The final third step involved "act[ing] with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan." Since that time, American special forces had to conduct a unilateral covert raid inside Pakistan to eliminate Osama bin Laden, who had been hiding in a massive compound in the same town as the country's premiere military academy. On September 22, 2011, outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified before Congress asserting linkages between the Pakistani military and intelligence services and the Afghan Haqqani terrorist network, which had just attacked the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.

No matter how well the Obama Administration portrays its stewardship of the war from 2009 to 2012, it will very hard pressed to deny the withdrawal from Afghanistan as a major setback for the United States in the region.

Daniel R. Green, a Washington Institute for Near East Policy fellow and veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq, asserted the Taliban and their supporters will present it as a victory and speculated how the enemy would craft its narrative for the all-important ongoing battle of narratives.

In the words of a Taliban propagandist: "The mujahedeen have beaten the Americans! Like the British and the Russians before them, the Americans have tired of their war to oppress Islam in Afghanistan and are leaving."

In the analysis of a Pakistani intelligence officer: “As we have always known, the Americans are leaving Afghanistan and, as expected, the task of cleaning it up has fallen to us. … The U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden taught us many things about U.S. capabilities and intentions. They do not respect our sovereignty and are willing to strike targets within our borders without our cooperation. … As the Americans draw down in Afghanistan, we will partner with our Taliban allies to extend their reach into areas the Afghans and the Americans do not control to extend our influence."

In the mind of a senior al-Qaeda leader: "Our strategy of attrition against the Americans is working as they begin their withdrawal from Afghanistan. Their bankruptcy and weak economy are forcing them to retreat from the world, and al-Qaida will take advantage of these new opportunities. … Our affiliates in Somalia and Yemen have grown in significance and our presence in Iraq continues even though our core group has been weakened with the death of Osama bin Laden. Our cause endures."

Michael Scheuer, the former chief of and adviser to the intelligence community's bin Laden unit, recently concluded bin Laden's successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, "faces a situation more promising than any al-Qaeda has encountered since its founding. [emphasis added]" Contemporary Al Qaeda is "multiethnic, multilingual, organizationally sound and resilient, religiously tolerant and militarily effective... larger, younger, better educated, much more geographically dispersed and has many more adherents than the one [al-Zawahiri] joined in 1998."

And how do drones fit into this narrative? According to Dr. Peter Singer, author of Wired for War, the use of drones results in a disconnect between the message sent in the war of ideas versus the message received -- "…what about the message that is received? I asked the leading newspaper editor of Lebanon, and there was actually a drone flying above him at the time. This is his quote: 'It’s just another sign of the cold-hearted, cruel Israelis and Americans who are also cowards, because they send out machines to fight us. They don’t want to fight us like real men; they’re afraid to fight, so we just have to kill a few of their soldiers to defeat them. [emphasis added].'"

Asymmetrically Vulnerable

Drones maybe attractive as low cost alternatives to pricey procurement programs and satisfy a recurrent search for technological silver bullets to security challenges, but it cannot compensate for what Scheuer ironically notes is Al Qaeda's "[most] reliable ally -- Washington's interventionist foreign policy." Because with intervention comes costs and IEDs and suicide attacks will remain key components of enemy cost-imposition strategies.

IEDs are possible because the raw materials are abundant and cheap. Moreover, IED production will undergo continuous innovation for these reasons and the ability to "open source" the research and development across global networks. The United States has committed approximately $13 billion between FY2007 and FY2010 to fund its Joint IED Defeat Organization within the Department of Defense. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had to intervene personally to ensure the department procured more than 16,000 mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles at a cost of approximately $22.7 billion. The costs to care for servicemembers with injuries related to IEDs are substantial and will be borne into the future.

Suicide attacks shock the target population with their suddenness, lethality, and manifest desperation. More critically, suicide attacks possess the advantage of being undeterrable acts -- and not because they’re the acts of religious zealots. According to Robert Pape, the academic who led the compilation of CPOST data, the phenomenon of suicide attacks result not from religious fanaticism, but opposition to foreign occupation forces, particularly those from a country with a distinctly different religious background.

These tactics preceded the American commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their demonstrated efficacy ensures that if America is intent on supporting the [insert name] regime in [insert country] with forces, then the enemy will be sure to make the decision a costly one.

The use of drones will be irrelevant.

After Afghanistan, Beyond Asymmetries

Unfortunately, American national security planning defaults are apparently set to intervene and deploy.

America withdrew from Saudi bases -- bin Laden's pretext for the September 11th terrorist attacks -- in 2003, and America will withdraw from Afghanistan in 2012, but it has apparently decided to sustain its presence in the region, via drones. According to September 20, 2011 Washington Post reporting, the Obama administration is establishing covert bases in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Seychelles to host drones for counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda organizations in the western Indian Ocean region.

As such, American warfighters (and citizens) will have to continuing coping with the enemies’ reliance on improvised weapons, suicide attacks, and whatever means they can conceive or discover.

The search for an asymmetric advantage is not new in warfare, but the enemy has been concocting weapons out of disparate materials and donning suicide vests in defense of their identity and integrity. Deposing the Taliban and Baathist regimes was justified. Direct action against bin Laden and the drone strike against al-Alwaki were justified.

But American enthusiasm for drone technologies is a defective defense and potentially malignant. Drone technologies will have a place in American military capabilities, but as an integrated component, not the tip of its spear. Strikes remotely directed from a distance measured in thousands of miles (or worse, autonomously executed by the vehicle itself, a morally reprehensible possibility) is a slippery slope into fully militarizing foreign policy and exacerbating the lawlessness emergent in the global arena.

War is, as it has always been, a clash of wills. Going forward, the words of America’s finest contemporary strategist, Air Force COL John Boyd, should be heeded “Machines don’t fight wars. … Humans fight wars. You must get into the minds of humans. That’s where the battles are won.”

1 The data has been compiled from the aforementioned sources: iCasualties.org (search parameters set to IED fatalities in Afghanistan); CPOST (search parameters set to Afghanistan for all years searchable, 2004-2009), and New America Foundation (in the instance of variable figures (”Militants killed: 3-4”), the highest number was selected). For the supporting data set, please see Google Docs URL.)

Overdue For A Third Party?

2011-09-14T18:12:00.001-07:00

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In the last week of August, on the op-ed pages of the Wall Street Journal, Patrick Caddell and Douglas Schoen, two prominent Democratic pollsters, declared the United States in the midst of a “pre-revolutionary movement.” Referencing a number of polls and research depicting widespread disgust with the current political state of affairs, Caddell and Schoen predicted a third political party would emerge in 2012. Caddell and Schoen noted third parties had emerged during similar periods of “economic distress and political alienation,” such as the independent John Anderson and Ross Perot bids in 1980 and 1992, respectively. For good measure, Caddell and Schoen commented the distress and alienation of those periods were “nowhere as severe as they are today.” Interestingly, the two omitted the modern era’s other famous third party candidate, George Wallace, who ran in 1968, another infamous annus horribilis. Reviewed in the aggregate, these three bids each occurred twelve years apart. If modern independent bids are subject to a twelve year cycle, a third party is not only conceivable in 2012, but it’s also overdue by eight years. The 2004 election was not a tranquil election, taking place as it did amidst a controversial war and raw appeals by the two parties to their respective bases, so why didn’t a third party emerge in accordance with this ostensible timetable? More importantly, will a third party indeed emerge in the 2012 election? Revisiting these three prior elections will help provide clues.

From 1968 to 1992, Choosing Between Goldwaterites and McGovernites

George Wallace famously declared there wasn't "a dime's worth of difference between the Republicans and Democrats," but that's probably because he didn't recognize the ideological divide that was emerging between the two political parties.

In the 1964 election, conservative insurgents gained control of the Republican Party and nominated Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, who, despite ardent support of civil rights, felt compelled to vote against the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act, primarily because of his deeply held libertarian philosophy. Incumbent President Lyndon Johnson had little difficulty painting Goldwater as an extremist and swept to re-election in a landslide. Despite the historic loss, the Republican Party became, and has remained, the principal political vehicle for American conservatives.

In 1968, the Republican Party, still reeling from the debacle in 1964, nominated former Vice-President Richard Nixon, more moderate than Goldwater but conservative enough given his staunch anti-communism. With Johnson declining to run again, the Democratic Party nominated Vice-President Hubert Humphrey. He was a stalwart advocate of the administration's Great Society and civil rights initiatives, but Humphrey's nomination (made possible only by Robert F. Kennedy’s assassination) enraged anti-war elements. Wallace, the Democratic pro-segregation governor of Alabama, entered the race as an independent, hoping to prevent Nixon or Humphrey from winning an electoral vote majority. If he succeeded, the election would be decided by the House of Representatives. If this occurred, he might have a chance to determine who would win, preferably whichever nominee would accommodate him and his supporters' opposition to civil rights. On Election Day, Wallace received just over 13 percent and the electoral votes of five Southern states. Wallace’s tally reduced Nixon’s popular vote margin to less than 1 percent, but Nixon ended up winning a majority in the Electoral College. Wallace may have failed to deny either major party nominee an electoral vote majority, but his candidacy marked a key transition in the American voters’ ideological realignment.

In 1972, the liberal insurgents thwarted in 1968 finally secured control of the Democratic Party and nominated South Dakota Senator George McGovern. While he was the top choice of the party's liberal base, incumbent President Richard Nixon had an easy time depicting McGovern as too radical and, like Johnson, swept to re-election in a historic landslide. Nonetheless, the Democratic Party became and remained, just as the Republicans in 1964, the primary political instrument of American liberalism going forward.

Wallace's denunciation would have been true if he had said it in 1960, but not after 1972. Since the 1964-1972 period, the Republican and Democratic parties have been the traditional homes for conservatives and liberals, respectively. Furthermore, the divergence produced what American political scientist Byron Shafer aptly labeled “cross-cutting majorities” in the electorate, because voter expectations for the opposing branches of government resulted in votes for opposing parties. Since the presidency is the locus of authority on national security affairs and Congress has jurisdiction over budgetary matters, after 1968, Republican conservatives came to dominate presidential elections while Democratic liberals established a near permanent majority in the House of Representatives. Between 1968 and 1992, American voters essentially voted Goldwaterites to the presidency and McGovernites to Congress.

As such, John Anderson's independent run in 1980 was an anomaly in the same way that the election's Democratic incumbent was an exception to the Republican lock on the presidency.

After 1972, to achieve unified control of the presidency and Congress, a political party would have to field a presidential candidate with a conservative approach to foreign policy (and social matters) and congressional candidates favoring liberal economic policies. Such a task was understandably easier for the Democratic Party than the Republican Party, especially when the party is just coming off a historic defeat. In 1976, Democratic nominee James Carter succeeded by doing just that – running as a Southern moderate attractive enough to former Wallace supporters, yet sufficiently liberal to win over the base.

Unfortunately for Democrats, Carter, a self-proclaimed "outsider" (with only four years of experience in elective office), was woefully unprepared for the presidency. He never developed what should have been a productive relationship with a Democratic Congress and he foundered in the face of economic and foreign crises. Leading up to the 1980 election, his weakness drew a rare primary challenge in the form of Edward M. Kennedy, and two general election contenders, Ronald Reagan, the Republican Party nominee, and Republican Congressman John Anderson, a fiscal conservative (but social liberal) who ran as an independent.

Anderson had hoped to capitalize on the disunity within the Democratic Party and widespread apprehension over Reagan's strident conservatism. Anderson polled well at the campaign's outset -- 25% in summer of 1980 -- but could not build the momentum necessary to remain on par with the major parties' candidates. More pointedly, Reagan proved a strong campaigner and earned voters' confidence by soundly dispatching Anderson and Carter in successive televised debates. In the end, Anderson's run was a quixotic one; voters remained split in their preferences and restored a Republican presidency and Democratic Congress that would remain in place for another twelve years.

In 1992, another feisty southerner asserted there wasn't much difference between the Republicans and Democrats. Like Wallace, he probably didn't recognize his modicum of success in the polls was merely an indicator of changing fortunes for the still ideologically divergent parties.

Perot Helps Sever the Gordian Knot of a Republican Presidency and Democratic Congress

Within the Republican Party, President George H.W. Bush, never a doctrinaire “Goldwaterite,” had to cope with two major conservative revolts. After reneging on his 1988 campaign promise (and a fundamental tenet of conservative orthodoxy) to not raise taxes, Bush had to overcome a rebellion in the House Republican conference led by Rep. Newt Gingrich, the party's whip and a conservative firebrand. After finally securing the budget deal, Bush had to contend with a primary challenge from conservative commentator Pat Buchanan, who rallied conservatives dissatisfied with Bush's handling of the economy and his call for an American-led “new world order”. Just like Carter, Bush’s weakness attracted two general election contenders, William Clinton, the Democratic Party nominee, and Texas billionaire Ross Perot.

Unlike Wallace, Perot's ambitions were more forthright. Unlike Anderson, they were more attainable. Perot wanted to win the presidency outright and possessed the means to do so independently. Furthermore, Perot was more centrist and a far better campaigner. His message focused on balanced budgets and problem solving, which resonated with a public frustrated by partisan gridlock and an economic downturn. Moreover, his unconventional approach to campaigning endeared him to disaffected voters. By mid-summer 1992, Perot was leading in national polls and in major electoral states. Unfortunately, his withdrawal and re-entry into the race fatally undermined his candidacy, and on election day, he polled only 18.9 percent. Perot's vote was the second highest tally earned by an independent candidate and denied Clinton, the eventual victor, a majority in the popular vote. Clinton only received a plurality, but he interpreted the combined portion of the vote received by him and Perot – 61.9 percent – as a mandate for change.

Regardless of the interpretation, the Republican lock on the presidency was seemingly broken.

At first glance, Clinton appeared to have succeeded in the same way Carter had -- by providing an appealing and electable Southern moderate face acceptable to the party's liberal base. Moreover, he was far more experienced and highly regarded for his political acumen and policy expertise.

However, Clinton did misinterpret the election returns -- the votes were cast in opposition to Bush and not for the traditional brand of Democratic liberalism. His disastrous effort to establish universal health care and his inability to define a coherent foreign policy in the wake of the Cold War's end further infuriated voters, who did not wait until the next presidential election to vent their frustration.

In the very next election, the 1994 congressional mid-terms, voters ousted the Democratic majorities in Congress, installing Republican majorities in the Senate and House. In the latter body, it would be the first time in forty years. After the 1994 elections, Republicans were reasonably optimistic they would capture the presidency as well. Nonetheless, in 1996, voters re-elected the Democratic President and the Republican Congress.

Why?

By 1991, the nation had elected a Republican to the presidency for five out of the past six elections and had just re-elected a Democratic House for the eighteenth consecutive time. When the aforementioned Shafer described the “cross-cutting majority” phenomenon in the same year, a major realignment seemed remote.

However, Shafer did outline a set of conditions that would allow for such a shift to occur. Shafer wrote "the key to any long-run reversals lies in a changing international order, in rising cultural tensions, and in growing economic dislocation."

Unbeknownst to him, events would indeed transpire over the next year and a half to satisfy these conditions. By the 1992 election, three major events – the end of the Cold War, the riots in Los Angeles, and the sharp recession of 1991 – would all contribute to the radically changed political landscape that would emerge in 1996.

The end of the Cold War diminished the importance of having a vigilant conservative anti-communist in the presidency. Similarly, the Los Angeles riots and the recession undercut the appeal of low tax, laissez faire approaches. The result was the collapse of the voting majority in favor of Republican conservative presidents. Bush, despite riding high with 91 percent approval ratings after the smashing victory in the Persian Gulf War, did not stand a chance without significant ideological re-positioning. Clinton, promising reforms favorable to the middle class and successfully communicating his ability to “feel your pain,” offered the right alternative.

By the same token, the end of the Cold War did not mean voters would tolerate drift amidst the “unipolar moment.” Whatever the successor to the containment doctrine would be, the public expected the president to identify it. The Clinton Administration's mismanagement of crises in Haiti, Russia, Somalia, and Rwanda only reinforced long-held perceptions of Democratic ineptitude in foreign affairs. Similarly, congressional priorities in the wake of the Los Angeles riots and the recession – nationalization of health care, gays in the military – even further soured voters. A Democratic Congress, led by the unspectacular Majority Leader George Mitchell and Speaker Thomas Foley and embodied by the likes of big government liberal dinosaurs such as Dan Rostenkowski, was similarly doomed. Gingrich and his fellow Republicans, promising balanced budgets, less spending, lower taxes, and welfare reform, offered an unmatchable alternative.

Unless another round of changes occurred in the conditions named by Shafer, Democratic liberals would be dominating presidential elections for some time just as Republican conservatives would enjoy a long majority in Congress. After 1994, American voters were poised to vote for Goldwaterites to Congress and for McGovernites to the presidency.

As before, if a political party wanted unified control of the presidency and Congress, it would have to field a presidential candidate with a coherent approach to foreign policy and a readiness to use the government purse on behalf of the economy and congressional candidates favoring conservative economic policies. This time, the task was easier for the Republican Party than the Democratic Party, especially coming off a frustrating defeat. In 2000, Republican nominee George W. Bush succeeded by doing just that; running as a "compassionate conservative" attractive to former Perot supporters, yet sufficiently conservative to win over the base.

Well, he succeeded somewhat.

Nader Ruins It For Third Partiers

Unlike Carter who was the exception to the Republican lock on the presidency, Bush, the would-be exception to a Democratic lock on the presidency, did not win both a popular and electoral vote majority. Bush won the electoral vote but lost the popular vote to Democratic nominee Albert Gore. Equally important was the fact that neither nominee received a majority of the popular vote -- Gore won 48.4 percent to Bush's 47.9 percent. Both nominees failed because Green Party candidate Ralph Nader secured 2.7 percent, a paltry amount in comparison to Wallace, Anderson, and Perot, but decisive nonetheless. This was especially true in Florida where Nader (and four other third party candidates) received vote totals greater than the 537 vote margin recorded for Bush over Gore.

While a number of factors and circumstances could have tipped the election in any direction, the central lesson learned by all participants -- the nominees, the parties, and the voters -- is that every single vote counts. Independent and third party candidates might be able to capitalize on economic distress and political alienation and the presidency may be won only through the convoluted Constitutional mechanics of the Electoral College. However, comprehensive political power could only be attained by marshaling millions of voters via the two major political parties.

What does this mean in terms of the 2004 and 2012 elections?

Bush could have relived Carter’s experience had it not been for another major event satisfying one of Shafer's condition for a realignment in voter preferences.

With the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Bush became a wartime president and the office again became the locus of national security matters. As a result, voter preferences switched back to Republican conservatives. Bush achieved historically high approval ratings and received the Republican majorities in the Senate and House in the 2002 congressional mid-term elections.

Hard-line Democratic voters never accepted the 2000 results -- and more vehemently denounced the approval given by the Democratic-led Senate to the Bush Administration's 2002 request for authority to invade Iraq just before the congressional mid-term elections. They resolved to commit whatever was necessary to defeating Bush's re-election bid.

At the same time, the rise of online social networks finally impacted the nature of American politics, namely in terms of voter mobilization and fundraising.

Instead of another medium for candidates to advertise their platforms, online media evolved into vehicles for supporters to self-mobilize and recruit like-minded individuals. Furthermore, greater regularity in the use of online payment services, facilitated again by references from personal contacts, provided candidates with easy access to dollars only available to those with prodigious fundraisers and bundlers.

Liberal online groups, which originated in opposition to President Clinton's impeachment in 1998, resurfaced in support of former Vermont Governor Howard Dean's long-shot bid for the 2004 Democratic presidential nomination. Dean, an unabashed liberal, vaulted to frontrunner status on the basis of his antiwar platform and an enormous outpouring of support (and campaign funding) generated via online networks. Dean, though, ended up losing to the eventual party nominee, and the more electable candidate, Massachusetts Senator John Kerry.

Despite Dean's self-implosion shortly thereafter, online enthusiasts remained active in support of Kerry and organized Democratic voters across the country for races at all levels. Faced with such determination, the Bush campaign machine was equally aggressive in organizing and mobilizing its base supporters.

In a contest to be won by turning out the base, Ralph Nader's follow up bid for the presidency was generally ignored.

On election day 2004, Bush received very narrow popular and electoral vote majorities over Kerry, but majorities nonetheless. Ralph Nader received less than one-half of 1 percent. Voters, with the 2000 results fresh in their mind, were not going to "waste" their vote on a long-shot third party candidacy.

While Nader's 2000 bid diminished the utility of third party presidential runs, the 2004 election experience demonstrated to voters the potential of capturing power by self-organizing online, especially to those most ideologically committed. Overall turnout in 2004 increased by 19.6 million voters and each party’s base realized, if they kept up the pressure, then political success could be achieved if they could ensure the nominee was more reflective of and more responsive to them.

Who Needs A Third Party When You Capture One of the Two Major Ones?

This phenomenon manifested itself during the 2006 congressional mid-term elections when online liberal activists targeted conservative Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman. Seeking to punish Lieberman for his support of Bush Administration counter-terrorism policies, the aforementioned liberal “Netroots” mobilized in support of his primary opponent, Ned Lamont. Lieberman lost the party nomination to Lamont in the primary vote, a rare occurrence. Thereafter, Lieberman ran as an independent candidate in the general election and won re-election by a sizable margin, with the help of Republican and independent voters.

While Lieberman remained in the Senate, online liberal activism was critical to overall successes achieved by the Democratic Party in that year's elections.

After twelve years of Republican domination, the Democratic Party returned to power in both houses of the Congress. Two years later, Democratic nominee Senator Barack Obama easily dispatched Republican nominee John McCain, winning the largest popular majority in twenty years and capturing long-time Republican states like Virginia, North Carolina, and Indiana.

In successive elections, the Democratic Party had wholly ousted the Republican Party, which had harbored visions of an enduring majority only four years earlier.

At the time, the comprehensive Democratic victories in 2006 and 2008 seemed to herald an extended period for American liberalism, even the speed with Republican fortunes changed should have left liberals cautious. Why such volatility in voting did result in support for independent candidates or a third party was unclear. However, in the wake of the historic Republican victories in the 2010 congressional mid-term elections, the reason finally becomes clear.

Central to Republican successes in 2010 was the emergence of the "tea party," grassroots organizations that arose organically in opposition first to the Obama Administration's $1 trillion stimulus bill, and then later, its health care bill.

Akin to the Netroots, Tea Partiers targeted Republican officeholders who were insufficiently conservative. In 2010, three incumbent Republican Senators targeted by the Tea Party failed to be renominated. The last time such a high number of incumbent Senators failed to be renominated was in 1968 and 1980. Furthermore, numerous establishment-endorsed contenders failed to win the nomination, losing to Tea Party-backed favorites.

Between the 2004 and 2010 elections, the number and proportion of House freshmen rose every consecutive session, from 39 and 9 percent to 91 and 21 percent, respectively. The latter 2010 figures constitute the highest number and proportion of freshmen since 1964, second only to 1992, when the subsequent Congress featured 109 freshman, or 25 percent of the membership. When 2002 is included, the period entails five consecutive sessions of increasing number and proportion of House freshman. The last time five such sessions occurred was between 1966 and 1974.

Subsequent to the experience of the 2000 election, where the value of every single vote was dramatically demonstrated, and growing awareness that online communities can be powerful tools for political mobilization, voters no longer have to wait for a third party or independent candidate to register their displeasure with the two political parties.

Instead of responding to major events, the agitation of long-shot political gadflies, or even “economic distress and political alienation,” voters merely have to seek out fellow partisans, organize online, and mobilize more than the opposition in order to serve up a “thumpin’”or a “shellackin’.”

Even the creation of a “fourth political party,” as suggested by Caddell and Schoen’s op-ed, is possible. Furthermore, if online activists seize the opportunity to enact a “reform trifecta” -- end gerrymandering, simplifying ballot access, and rationalizing campaign finance -- then voters would no longer be limited to two political parties. The question would not be whether a third party emerges, but whether four, five, or six credible contenders emerge.

The last presidential election of the pre-partisan era, that of 1824, featured five major statesmen in American history:

John Quincy Adams, a former Secretary of State and the eventual president
Andrew Jackson, a former general, territorial governor, and future two-term president
Henry Clay, “the Great Compromiser” and one of the “immortal trio”, which included Daniel Webster and;
John C. Calhoun, a former Secretary of State and War and future Vice-President, and
William H. Crawford, a former Secretary of War and the Treasury.

Consider that when evaluating the incumbent and his would be opponent.

References:

Boller Jr., Paul F., Presidential Campaigns: From George Washington to George W. Bush
Dionne, E.J., Why Americans Hate Politics: The Death of the Democratic Process
Shafer, Byron E., The End of Realignment?: Interpreting American Electoral Eras

Little Prospect of Salvation This Defense Drawdown

2011-07-31T18:47:00.000-07:00

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In 2011, a United States at war on three fronts is concerned not with battles, bombing runs, or bodycounts but two numbers – 400 and 12. While American forces grapple with opponents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, the focus of daily national security discussion is how the Department of Defense will achieve $400 billion in budget reductions over the next twelve years as directed by President Barack Obama. The nation has finally yielded to its fiscal crisis by embracing calls for austerity and all sides have agreed the defense budget will not be exempt. Balancing national security imperatives with fiscal priorities is always a challenge, and, fortunately, in previous defense drawdowns, the nation was able to identify and capitalize on opportunities to adapt. Unfortunately, what distinguishes this period is the lack of an "innovation" or a "dramatic shift" that would sustain the U.S. armed forces' ability to preserve national security with less resources.

Previous Defense Drawdowns

The first defense drawdown occurred under President Dwight Eisenhower, who served from 1953 to 1961. Eisenhower’s first national security priorities were concluding the Korean War, which had become a stalemate, and reining in defense spending, which had climbed from $179 billion in FY1948 to $479 billion in FY1953, an increase of $313 billion, or 275% (FY2012 DOD Green Book). Ending the war in Korea permitted an immediate decrease to $373 billion in FY1954, which became the floor for defense spending through FY1961. While able to decrease the overall defense budget, Eisenhower readily recognized the consequence of inadequate resources, especially when the Korean War first erupted.

The innovation that helped Eisenhower achieve his priorities was the advancement of nuclear weapons. The United States no longer possessed a monopoly, but it was certainly ahead of the USSR in terms of the stockpile and its integration into national strategic planning and operational doctrine. Relying on nuclear weapons enabled the United States to counter the overwhelming Soviet advantage in conventional forces while permitting Eisenhower to cap defense spending throughout his term. Eisenhower shifted resources to the Air Force in order to develop the long-range strategic bombing capabilities needed to capitalize on nuclear weapons while keeping defense spending in check. Indeed, the amount allocated to the Air Force peaked at $175 billion in FY1958, the same year American defense spending peaked during the Eisenhower Administration, at $407 billion (FY2012 DOD Green Book). Eisenhower’s approach succeeded in achieving deterrence requirements vis-a-vis the USSR, but the caveat was diminished options available to policymakers in the event of a crisis. The succeeding Kennedy Administration’s exploration for alternatives led it to adopt the “flexible response” doctrine, which eventually paved the way for American involvement in Southeast Asia and the disastrous Vietnam War.

The second defense drawdown occurred under President Richard Nixon (coincidentally Eisenhower’s vice-president), who served from 1969 to 1974. Nixon took office three years after US involvement in Vietnam began to escalate -- during the 1968 presidential election year, 500,000 American troops were deployed. Opposition to the war overwhelmed the nation and contributed to the worst civil unrest witnessed in generations. Nixon’s priorities entailed successfully extricating the United States from the Vietnam War, while ensuring the American military received sufficient resources to rebuild in the aftermath. The preceding Kennedy and Johnson Administrations had increased defense spending from $404 billion in FY1961 to an average of $534 billion for the two year period of FY1967-1968 (FY2012 DOD Green Book). Having campaigned to end the Vietnam War and likely to face continuing unrest if the draft (and high defense spending) remained in place, Nixon’s options were limited.

Nixon ended up making a dramatic shift -- ending the draft and establishing the U.S. military as an All Volunteer Force. The decision (in combination with substantial troop withdrawals) neutralized the antiwar opposition and laid the basis for the future resurrection of American military power. (The first major commitment of American forces comprised of volunteers, the Persian Gulf War in 1991, ended in stunning victory, famously permitting the country to close the chapter on the “Vietnam Syndrome”.) Nonetheless, the immense success of the All Volunteer Force came with a price -- a growing divergence between civilian and military spheres within the country.

The Most Recent Defense Drawdown

The common thread to both these periods is the existential threat posed to America by the USSR. After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the next defense drawdown posed less risk. The need for compensating innovation or course of action was less dire as the international security environment had improved.

Unfortunately, the presiding Clinton Administration never fashioned a successor doctrine to containment to guide the use of American power and the consequences included ill-designed missions (Somalia), the increasingly frequent deployments for non-combat missions (e.g. the former Yugoslavia, no-fly zone over Iraq), and insufficient funding to meet readiness and modernization requirements.

A Congressionally directed National Defense Panel introduced the concept of “transformation” in 1997, but the opportunity was overshadowed by President William Clinton’s entanglement in the Monica Lewinsky scandal. The next chance came with George W. Bush’s election to the presidency in 2000. President Bush gave Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld a mandate to pursue transformation, but the attacks of September 11 interceded and the opportunity for comprehensive change was again overtaken, this time by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Worse, the massive allocation of resources committed to waging these wars negated the need to make hard choices.

The Next Defense Drawdown

Ten years and five trillion dollars later, the defense budget is poised for a massive decline. On April 13, President Obama directed a $400 billion reduction in national defense spending over the next twelve years. As the Department of Defense undertakes yet another comprehensive review of force structure and missions, due for completion in September or October, Ms. Mackenzie Eaglen of the Heritage Foundation indicated stated internal DOD guidance has directed reductions from $430 or $460 billion, while Oklahoma Senator Tom Coburn’s proposal includes $1 trillion in reductions as part of broader national debt reduction.

And the prospect of salvation during this next defense drawdown?

Perhaps technological breakthroughs like directed energy weapons?

In June, the Senate Armed Services Committee terminated the U.S. Navy's highly touted but experimental Free Electron Laser and Electromagnetic Rail Gun weapons projects. The two initiatives were high risk and expensive, but had also recently achieved important technical milestones. Complementary laser research exists but, as many have noted, the military has been waiting decades for laser weapons.

Maybe space-based weapons? Despite U.S. and Chinese demonstration of anti-satellite capabilities in 2007 and 2008, respectively, prevailing international norms preclude the militarization of space. More concretely, the centerpiece of the manned U.S. space program, the Space Shuttle, just flew its last mission and the country will go from being a pioneer to a bystander on space matters. (Indeed, the American military's growing dependence on space-based may prove a vulnerability.)

Perhaps a new doctrine like AirSea Battle?

As summarized by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, AirSea Battle is a new operational concept undertaken jointly by the U.S. Air Force and Navy to achieve power-projection synergies in the face of the anti-access and area denial tactics employed by potential adversaries. To fulfill its promise, however, the Department of Defense will have to make a sizable investment in next generation platforms, such as long-range strike. Preliminary estimates comprising both development and production range from $44 to $46 billion. Estimated unit costs would be below those for comparable existing assets (e.g. the B-2 bomber), but the aforementioned costs would hardly be acceptable in a favorable environment, much less the much more constrained one the department's entering now.

(The Army may have received a substantial proportion of defense dollars through the last decade (FY2012 DOD Green Book), but it doesn't mean they're prepared to return to historical shares (chart). Commenting on Army chief of staff-designate GEN Raymond Odierno's forthright defense of his service's importance, Daniel Goure of the Lexington Institute explained the services will be "struggling to redefine themselves" amidst the imminent budget drawdown. Goure added if a service can demonstrate its indispensability, then the service would be less vulnerable to budget reductions. However, the corollary is the "fraying" of jointness, as each service will fight to preserve its interests.)

Could new systems like precision weapons and remotely piloted vehicles suffice?

Both minimize the exposure of American service members to the dangers of combat. Both (theoretically) allow for the more limited and precise application of force, an important consideration given the war weariness of the American body politic. Lastly, precision weapons and remotely piloted vehicles are relatively inexpensive compared to other strike platforms.

Unfortunately, like nuclear weapons, the American monopoly on precision weapons and remotely-piloted vehicles is beginning to end as other actors have begun attaining equivalent capabilities.

Regarding the former, the development of ballistic missile capabilities by the PRC and Iran, in part, is what prompted the U.S. Air Force and Navy to explore AirSea Battle concepts. Moreover, countries such as France, Sweden, Israel, Russia, and Germany are making and selling guided rocket, artillery, and mortar rounds, which, in time, will end up in the possession of non-state actors, such as Hezbollah. (During the Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006, Hezbollah fired approximately four thousand rockets into Israel, the overwhelming majority of which were unguided, and disabled an Israeli Navy Sa'ar 5-class corvette off the coast of Lebanon with what was believed to be a radar-guided C-802 anti-ship missile.)

Regarding the latter, the United States remains dominant, but as U.S. Air Force LT GEN David A. Deptula (ret.), the former deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, stated, “We are well ahead in having established systems actively in use. But the capability of other countries will do nothing but grow.” As with ballistic missiles, the PRC and Iran are moving aggressively to develop indigenous drone capabilities, and the PRC will be less reluctant to sell such systems.

Lastly, precision weapons and remotely-piloted vehicles are unlike nuclear weapons in that they are more readily employable in a conflict. With the capability to wage war "surgically" and without the commitment of forces, international actors may be more inclined to exercise force than not (P.W. Singer, Wired For War).

Ultimately, precision weapons and remotely-piloted vehicles are unlikely to be a palliative for declining defense budgets because such capabilities merely fulfill operational and tactical requirements -- and against inferior opponents. The United States itself has barely mastered how precision weapons and remotely-piloted vehicles should be incorporated into military doctrine and other actors are already seeking equivalent or countervailing capabilities.

More pointedly, American leadership has not yet formulated a realistic national security strategy identifying national objectives and how available resources will be employed to achieve them. Substantial capabilities exist, but for what aims and to what extent is decidedly unclear. As noted previously, many expect Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's background as director of the Office of Management and Budget leaves him prepared for the likely fights over defense budget reductions. Such expectations may be justifiable, but Panetta is not and has not demonstrated he is a strategist. His predecessor, Robert Gates, emphatically warned math is not strategy and what American armed forces need now, absent "innovations" or "dramatic shifts," is a coherent strategy.

However, as Eisenhower and Nixon demonstrated during previous drawdowns, only the president can provide that. Whether Obama can remains uncertain.

08/03/11 Addendum

The above focuses on the manner in which the United States has shifted its approach to defense matters in the past and the limited options available today, principally because of a dearth of initiative within the Obama Administration.

However, informed proposals authored by experts outside administration exist and deserve attention. One should merit continued attention, that of U.S. Army COL Doug MacGregor (Ret.), the a decorated combat veteran and author of Breaking the Phalanx (1997) and Transformation under Fire (2003). COL MacGregor's 04/26/11 Foreign Policy article, "Lean, Mean Fighting Machine," persuasively asserts "that cutting defense doesn't mean going defenseless. It means reducing America's commitments overseas -- the latter-day version of "imperial overstretch" -- and changing the way the United States thinks about warfare. There's a way to do this, one that will allow for deep spending cuts, but in a manner that will preserve and enhance the U.S. military's competitive advantages while improving American national security." COL MacGregor submits the United States could achieve an estimated annualized savings of $239 billion resulting from withdrawals from overseas garrisons and restructuring the United States' forward military presence.

For additional information see:
1) Lean, Mean Fighting Machine
2) A Radical Plan for Cutting the Defense Budget and Reconfiguring the U.S. Military

09/10/11 Addendum

On Sept. 8, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments held an event at the National Press Club to present its findings on the decade in defense since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Mr. Todd Harrison conducted a portion of the briefing entitled "Shifting From Post-9/11 to Fiscal Austerity" (URL, Slides 13-20 of 28).

Slide 16 of his presentation discussed the aforementioned drawdowns and the corresponding impact on total national defense budget authority (see printer friendly version).

Additionally, Mr. Harrison discussed why the current cycle was different as well as the sources of the growth.

The Constant Adversary

2011-06-08T06:15:00.000-07:00

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Two distinctly different secretaries of defense. Two momentous periods in office. Two speeches separated by a decade but inextricably linked. On May 24, Secretary Robert Gates capped a series of departing addresses with a speech to the American Enterprise Institute, reviewing his efforts to achieve efficiencies across the department so that resources might be freed for the benefit of the American warfighter and the modernization of forces. Almost a decade prior, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld delivered an address to the Pentagon workforce, announcing his intention to achieve a comprehensive transformation in how the department conducted business. Gates's speech marked a triumphant valedictory as he leaves office being heralded as the nation's most significant secretary of defense, indeed one of the rare "wise men" from which the nation is fortunate to receive counsel. In contrast, some commentators hypothesized Rumsfeld's speech might be his last, given the vehement opposition to his plans and increasing calls for his resignation, including some from longtime conservative allies. As the reluctant heir to the wars and initiatives undertaken by Rumsfeld, few would have objected if Gates -- the "anti-Rumsfeld" -- had chosen to emphasize how his leadership differed, in both substance and style, and the corollary in terms of events. Instead, Gates echoed his repudiated predecessor by naming and warning about the lone constant from the two men's terms in office -- the institutional inertia of the massive Defense Department bureaucracy.

An Unlikely Convergence...?

When Rumsfeld took office in January 2001, the preceding Clinton Administration had presided over general peace and prosperity, but had failed to craft a coherent approach to defense matters. The period “between the wars” was marked by high economic growth rates and unprecedented fiscal surpluses, but reduced defense funding, particularly for procurement, and repeated overseas deployments resulted in aging equipment and lower unit readiness. The incoming Bush Administration promised “help was on the way” and the president gave Rumsfeld a direct mandate to implement changes.

Rumsfeld has been the only individual to serve in the post twice; he was a highly regarded businessman and an accomplished corporate turnaround artist. The sum of these experiences left Rumsfeld intent on enacting “transformation.” After only eight turbulent months on the job, Rumsfeld spoke with complete urgency, pointedly asserting that modernizing the department was a “matter of life and death.” Pre-emptively dismissing criticisms he was attacking the department, Rumsfeld declared he was merely acting “to liberate it... to save it from itself.”

In contrast, Gates came to the post after a decade of retirement.# The Bush Administration’s principal foreign policy endeavor, regime change in Iraq, had degenerated into a “long, hard slog” and Gates initially focused on reversing the situation by directing resources and equipment there. Success on this front and accolades for his management style earned him retention by the incoming Obama Administration, becoming the first individual to serve as defense secretary for two presidents of different parties. Gates arrived at his pronouncement after four and a half long years consumed by wars and a newfound urgency to rein in runaway government spending -- “an era of debt and austerity at home”. Eschewing talk of transformation or liberation, Gates instead preferred to focus on the “health and future of the military as an institution” -- of which securing the same would require “fundamentally re-shaping the [department’s] priorities”.

Rumsfeld portrayed the challenge more starkly, ominously labeling the Pentagon bureaucracy an “adversary that poses a threat, a serious threat, to the security of the United States of America.”

Gates instead opted for a more circumspect characterization, referring instead to “institutional obstacles in the Pentagon -- cultural, procedural, [and] ideological.”

Ultimately, Rumsfeld and Gates did differ significantly -- in terms of backgrounds, temperament, prevailing circumstances, and priorities -- but both achieved successes qualified by the inability to out-maneuver an entrenched bureaucracy.

Or a Convergence Preordained?

Rumsfeld asserted his ire wasn’t aimed at his people, but at the “the processes … the systems” that had resulted “the uniformity of thought and action that we too often impose on them,” and, even worse, a stifling aversion to risk. The department’s first Quadrennial Defense Review report in 1997 underscored the lack of imagination. Six years after the end of the Cold War, department leadership could only offer outmoded planning constructs and obsolete force structures in its conclusions. In contrast, the independent National Defense Panel of the same year, discussed the need for broad transformation across the government, spirited experimentation within DOD, and, more pointedly, a measure of risk, because America’s military advantages, while still substantial, were failing to evolve in step with a changing world. Rumsfeld embraced this call and did succeed in implementing a number of changes.#

Gates arrived with no ambitions of transformation but instead promised to focus on nothing but “Iraq, Iraq, and Iraq”. Gates and GEN David Petraeus shepherded the Bush Administration’s surge to a successful conclusion and, by 2008, DOD had begun planning the withdrawal of forces. At the same time, Gates restored constructive relations with Congress and his flag officers, a welcome change from Rumsfeld’s readiness to dismiss their perspectives. Given these accomplishments, President Obama decided to retain him as secretary of defense. With this opportunity, Gates translated his initial focus on Iraq into the broader mantra of “rebalancing,” whereby the department would finally direct resources to current fights and prepare for similar missions in the future.

For his part, Rumsfeld undertook more risk than was tolerable in a time of war in two theaters. In Iraq, the consequences of pursuing smaller, lighter, and networked forces became painfully apparent -- especially when the military scrambled to properly armor their vehicles amidst an increasingly deadly Iraqi insurgency. At a December 2004 town hall meeting with service members, Rumsfeld responded to comments about the lack of armor with the now infamous statement “you go to war with the Army you have. They’re not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” With that statement, Rumsfeld’s fate was sealed. He persisted until 2006, when sectarian violence exploded in Iraq following the Samarra mosque bombing. That year, institutional opposition worsened and culminated in the infamous “revolt of the generals” in 2006. (Only after the disastrous mid-term elections later that year did President Bush finally dismiss Rumsfeld.)

Gates similarly encountered a recalcitrant bureaucracy when it slow-walked his priorities, namely unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and (ironically) mine-resistant vehicles. Gates succeeded, but only after demonstrating he wouldn’t hesitate to hold senior civilian appointees and flag officers to account for serious missteps -- revelations of poor patient care at the Army’s Walter Reed Hospital, the Air Force’s mishandling of nuclear weapons. Gates scored additional victories, namely the cancellation of massively expensive acquisition programs, but his pursuit of efficiencies met with only limited success. When Gates speaks of an inability to reduce overhead, the Fourth Estate (astonishingly a title actually embraced by components of DOD), or compensation and benefits, it is probable he is recalling these recurrent frustrations with the department bureaucracy.

“People say the Pentagon does not have a strategy. They are wrong. The Pentagon does have a strategy; it is: ‘Don’t interrupt the money flow, add to it.’”

USAF COL John R. Boyd

The Department of Defense, despite its astounding scope and grave mission, is the equal of any other bureaucracy whereby the absence of competitive pressures or performance metrics result in incentives for organizational bloat and inflated funding requirements. Moreover, whatever rationale can be employed to justify its preservation will be employed.

History has shown defense budget allocations among the three military departments are virtually immune to rising and declining budgets. Less readily recognized is the continuous growth of Defense-wide appropriations, the locus of funding for policy and support entities, the military health system, common information services and systems sustainment, contracts, family support programs, administrative functions for the military services, as well as combat support agencies, and the activities of intelligence agencies and the Special Operations Command.

According to the National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2012, Defense-wide appropriations rose from 6.5 percent in FY1970 to 12.5% in FY1980, amidst a substantive decline in overall defense spending during the same time (DATA, CHART). During the subsequent Reagan Administration buildup, overall Defense-wide appropriations amounts declined, returning to the 6 percent range by FY1990. As the Cold War wound down between FY1990 and 1992, Defense-wide appropriations again rose as a proportion, climbing 5 percentage points over three years as declining defense budgets returned. Fast forward a decade and Defense-wide appropriations peaked at 15.4 percent of the overall defense budget in FY2000, even though total appropriations had declined over 100 hundred billion dollars during that period.

By FY2002, the year immediately following the September 11 attacks, Defense-wide appropriations grew by 30 billion dollars, a level equivalent to all of the three military departments combined, and comprising an all-time peak of 19.7 percent. The rush to fund the military for the global war on terrorism immediately reduced this proportion over the next decade, but it never fell below 14 percent.

According to FY2012 budget projections, Defense-wide appropriations will never fall below 18 percent through FY2016.

***
Current CIA Director Leon Panetta is President Obama’s nominee to succeed Gates and many expect his background as House Budget Committee Chairman and director of the Office of Management and Budget leaves him prepared for the likely round of fights over defense budget reductions. Bush gave Rumsfeld a mandate and Obama essentially delegated national security policymaking to Gates -- and both still came up short. In battling DOD’s “semi-feudal system” and “amalgam of fiefdoms,” even the office of secretary of defense and certain to decline budgets are not enough. As Dr. Peter Singer of the Brookings Institute has noted, President Obama has yet to deliver a dedicated address on defense matters; taming the Department of Defense bureaucracy will take purposeful and comprehensive presidential leadership.

Osama Bin Laden: This Is Not Over By A Long Shot

2011-05-04T11:37:00.000-07:00

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"[The Russians’] worst misfortune was his birth... their next worst his death."

Winston Churchill, on the death of Vladimir Lenin, founder of the USSR

On May 2, 2011 (Pakistan time), American special forces conducted a raid on a resident near Abbottabad, Pakistan, that ended with the fatal shooting of Osama bin Laden, founder and leader of the global Islamist terrorist organization Al Qaeda. American Navy SEALs took his body into custody, positively identified bin Laden through genetic identification, and then released the body into the sea within 24 hours. President Barack Obama announced the news later that evening to celebrations across the country and around the world. Bin Laden eluded capture early on in the American war against global terrorism and his continued elusiveness only compounded the frustration later experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq. Coming after the tragedy of 3,000 innocents lost to his suicide attackers on September 11, three wars in the Middle East, hundreds of billions of dollars spent on national and homeland security, the twin feelings of jubilation and relief are understandable. Similarly, the expectations for a more secure America are as well, but sadly, they are not justified.

Bin Laden Only the Latest in a Long Line

Bin Laden’s emergence and barbarity paralleled that of his twentieth century antecedent -- Vladimir Lenin. Bin Laden, in the same manner as Lenin (and Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, Mao Tse-Tung, and Ruhollah Khomeini) combined charisma, ambition, organizational discipline, and ruthlessness in pursuit of grandiose objectives to reshape the prevailing political order. Except Bin Laden succeeded in upending his world without the resources and apparatus of a functioning state or a conventional military.

Bin Laden’s principal strengths were a seductive fantasy ideology providing a potent counter-narrative to American-led globalization, a flair for mass-casualty terrorism, and most importantly, an adaptable and resilient network structure both durable and easily replicated. American policymaker and scholar Fred Iklé predicted this threat in 1997, presciently warning then of “a twenty-first Lenin.” Iklé asserted a future revolutionary’s access to modern technology (namely weapons of mass destruction), ability to devise asymmetric tactics, and readiness to employ deception would exploit the vulnerabilities of Western liberal democracies.

Fortunately, bin Laden never obtained access to weapons of mass destruction. His bid to galvanize the Muslim world by promising the rebirth of the Caliphate in the wake of a global Western-Islamic war failed utterly, but his legacy, mantle, and vision will be taken up yet again by the next Lenin.

So Who or What is the Next Threat?

Few individuals have risen to Bin Laden’s prominence, but when Iklé issued his warning, Bin Laden was still just an aspiring terrorist who had just been ejected from Sudan.

Anwar al-Awlaki, an Islamic lecturer and former imam, is a possible successor, having played a critical role in transforming a local Yemeni militant organization into Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Awlaki’s name has been connected with the 2005 bombings in London, the 2009 Fort Hood shootings, and the failed 2009 Christmas Day airplane bombing, and the unsuccessful 2010 attempt in Times Square.

Most importantly though is the fact that al-Awlaki is a former U.S. citizen (born in New Mexico in 1971 and holder of numerous degrees from American universities) and has principally succeeded by recruiting and motivating others via the Internet. Merely speaking English and possessing a talent for online Islamist propaganda, al-Awlaki has quickly achieved notoriety in a relatively short space of time.

Mercifully to date, only a few Americans, and expatriate ones at that, have been drawn to Islamist extremism; America can only hope its national fabric has withstood the erosion of loyalty and Balkanization observed in other countries.

Al-Awlaki, in the same manner as bin Laden, is representative of “fourth generation warfare,” as conceived by U.S. Marine Corps COL T.X. Hammes (Ret.), William Lind, and other noted military scholars. Fourth Generation Warfare contends future conflict will feature networked insurgents waging low-intensity conflict across a variety of realms (military, political, economic, and societal) with the aim of de-legitimizing a given sovereign authority.

In developing this concept, COL Hammes cited the Chinese, Vietnamese, Nicaraguan, and Palestinian insurgents as prototypes of fourth generation warfare antagonists. In each case, the insurgents succeeded in changing the policies of Western democracies; once their forces departed, the insurgencies were free to achieve their local objectives by using more conventional techniques.

COL Hammes declined to predict the likely shape of fifth generation warfare, but highlighted the 2001 anthrax attack as a probable indicator. Launched anonymously, authorities have still not issued a definitive conclusion as to who was responsible. In this vein, COL Hammes and others have noted modern technology empowers solitary individuals to a degree not witnessed before in history.

Contemporary fiction and film have increasingly presented the phenomenon of one individual taking on the state and the world with devastating results. See the work of Daniel Suarez, an American IT consultant who has briefed the intelligence community, which recounts the exploits of a brilliant video game programmer whose death triggers networked programs to launch an assault on all aspects of human relationships in a modern world.

How exactly does one individual take on the world?

Easily, in the world of “open source warfare.” As John Robb, a former U.S. Air Force special operator, has noted, modern-day insurgents are operating in the same fashion as open-source software programmers -- organizing spontaneously around common goals, sharing information, and maintaining loose and non-hierarchical networks -- and at a pace more rapid than the United States can keep up. In the Internet era, lone insurgents can remain anonymous via “dark networks,” download the latest do-it-yourself weapons technology, discuss recommended tactics, and broadcast their latest exploits.

Why would one individual want to take on the world (especially when the United States military is apparently capable of finding you anywhere)?

Of fear, greed, and honor -- to cite ancient Greek historian Thucydides’s immortal triptych -- bin Laden and fellow Islamist extremists were motivated by the last. Decrying the ascent of an infidel West and the humbling of the once great Islamic civilization, bin Laden believed his quest would restore Islam’s honor. The subsequent war seemed to confirm Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis, but more mundane desires and crasser passions will be equally prevalent.

U.S. Army LT COL Ralph Peters (Ret.) has repeatedly written how “discarded” individuals around the world will seethe with envy at the prosperity and power of the United States. With America so far away, these individuals will instead strike at the local government, one which is riddled with corruption and has been complicit in his home country’s vast inequality.

For Peters, the Mexican Revolution of 1910 is the complex and bloody prototype for the many rebellions besetting the world today. During that revolution, idealists committed violence in the name of social justice and economic distribution; conversely, in the present day, criminal opportunists are reducing countries to chaos all in the name of greed and market share.

Next Steps?

In the near term, American forces remain committed in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the latter, the situation has stabilized and the U.S. presence is declining. In the former, American forces are seemingly stalemated and, with the elimination of bin Laden, may have even less justification to remain in substantive numbers than before.

Public sentiment is no longer inclined to sacrifice American blood and treasure to protect the feckless and corrupt Karzai regime; the United States should withdraw its forces and make peace with Mullah Mohammed Omar and the Taliban. (After a year of resumed relations, the United States can always renege and return to eliminate Omar and his cabal.)

In the longer term, the United States, as submitted previously, will have little to no knowledge of where or who his antagonist is or exactly how the antagonist will strike at him. Accordingly, the United States will really only know one thing -- threats will persist and the ability to counter will depend on overcoming the encumbrances of preceding choices and adopting capabilities and attributes necessary to defeating future threats.

In terms of capabilities, the first priority should be a future force structure that emphasizes the battlefield warfighter, not bloated command structures or the promises of cutting edge technological weapons. Given the efficacy of American service members over the past decade in comparison to the non-performance of gold-plated weapons systems, the decision to shift resources should be straightforward. A second priority should be re-focusing military doctrine on the destruction of the enemy, whether it is state-based or non-state, and not stabilization, reconstruction, or relief.

Opposing sides in the conventional / counterinsurgency debate would vehemently respond the destruction of the enemy is a primary objective for them too, and justifiably so. However, traditionalists contend the attention on insurgencies is counter-productive, while reformers dismiss the probability of future conventional wars; the perspectives have merit but downplay the risk inherent with each approach. In the end, the recourse to an either/or stance just ignores the adaptability demonstrated by the US military.

As the latter half of the war in Iraq showed, the American military is quite capable of self-criticism and pivoting doctrinally. Whether the American military "forgot" the lessons of the Vietnam War or purposely ignored them is irrelevant. Midway through the Iraq War, key leaders recognized the inadequacy of prevailing approaches, developed alternatives, and executed them -- within a short period of time and with the limited manpower available to them. Lastly, destruction of the enemy should be the extent of the commitment, not managing the consequences of their destruction and ensuring subsequent stability.

Additional priorities include expanded intelligence activities and operations to gain a broader and deeper understanding of foreign cultures, religions, and societies; and, a dedicated man-hunting capability.

In terms of attributes, America must embrace resiliency, since perfect security is unattainable. Achieving resiliency however will require the American national government relinquish a large number of the non-security responsibilities and authorities assumed since the nation graduated to superpowerdom, principally because the American national government has assumed roles requiring the extraction and expenditure of resources far in excess of what is available. As American strategist Edwark Luttwak has noted in discussing the Byzantine Empire, a key reason for the empire’s endurance for over 800 years was its scrupulous husbanding of economic and military resources.

To close, the elimination of bin Laden is a victory to savor, but the threat, barbarity, and violence he heralded demonstrated this challenge to American security will persist.

Congratulations to the warfighters and operators who made this victory possible.

War Is Too Important to Be Left To [Insert Rival Here]

2011-04-30T21:04:00.000-07:00

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"It's a mess…" Anonymous senior administration official on American operations in Libya

The minimalist steps taken by the Obama Administration in Libya have failed to secure regime change and the resulting stalemate between pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces has only revived strains in modern civil-military relations. The American Republic is not in danger of succumbing to a military coup d'etat, but the gap between civilian and military spheres has been readily recognized from within and from without the government. The mess in the above quote refers not to the situation on the ground in Libya but the dysfunction plaguing Administration national security policy-making and again the culprit is the "culture clash" between the civilian commander-in-chief and military officers. While few countries have figured out how to conduct a war solely in pursuit of humanitarian aims without a full commitment of available resources, the difference in civilian and military leaders regarding the efficacy of applied military force (especially of the magnitude possessed by the U.S. military) over the past two decades has started to complement the polarization coloring other policy debates. Problematic civilian-military relations are not uncommon in U.S. history; however, a polarized relationship is and its emergence could exacerbate the challenges of an uncertain international security environment for an increasingly faltering American superpower.

Appetite for Intervention

Following the nation’s (unexpectedly) stunning victory in the Persian Gulf War, President George H.W. Bush famously remarked the United States had finally kicked the “Vietnam Syndrome.” Coupled with the collapse of the nation’s sole existential threat, American political and intellectual leaders pondered the possibility of a “unipolar moment” and, for the first time since the early days of Cold War bipartisanship, both major parties embraced opportunities to exercise military force as a solution to foreign policy problems.

Nevertheless, the victory in the Persian Gulf War may have re-legitimized the use of force and the Bush 41 Administration’s successful stewardship may have demonstrated the efficacy of a healthy civilian-military division of labor, but the prospect of a militaristic American foreign policy led to a sharp divergence in opinion between civilian and military leaders. In this newfound enthusiasm to use military force, civilian leadership was prepared to override misgivings and objections from military leadership.

To apply a broad brush to the two decades since 1991, the 1990s witnessed the application of force to achieve humanitarian aims (the Clinton Doctrine) and the 2000s featured the exercise of force to achieve democratization (the Bush Doctrine).

Under the Clinton Administration, a liberal Democratic Party (the locus of post-Vietnam War opposition to use of force abroad) rallied in support of overseas interventions in Haiti and the former Yugoslavia. In the case of the latter, the party’s concession to the utility of force principally took the form of peackeeping forces and, during the 1999 war in Kosovo, a campaign solely consisting of airpower.

The election of a conservative Republican Bush 43 Administration and the return appointment of many veterans from the Persian Gulf War era (Richard Cheney, Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz) led many to conclude the exercise of force would occur only after a rigorous review, with commensurate resources, but above all, sparingly. Instead, the events of September 11 and an offensive campaign against Islamic jihadists resulted in a decade long commitment of ground forces in Afghanistan and Iraq to stand up democratic regimes.

In the 1990s, the Administration’s aversion to ground forces may have reflected a lingering skepticism in longtime Democratic Party leaders and policymakers, but many accounts from the period also document the military’s inclination to present only unacceptably large (and thus politically unpalatable) operational requirements when asked for options. At best, civilian leadership may have been unrealistic in expecting bloodless military solutions to nettlesome problems like failed states and rogue terrorists, but, at worst, the military may have been guilty of purposely seeking ways to shirk guidance from their commander-in-chief.

In the 2000s, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld compelled military commanders to craft a leaner operational plan for Iraq. The quiescence of the flag officers and Rumsfeld’s approach and style were tolerated as long as his plans achieved success. However, as conditions in Iraq worsened and Rumsfeld resisted calls for a greater commitment of ground forces and a shift in tactics, dissatisfaction rapidly emerged and civilian-military relations reached their nadir in 2006 with the “revolt of the generals,” when six retired flag officers openly called for Rumsfeld’s dismissal. President Bush eventually dismissed Rumsfeld after a poor electoral showing that fall.

To date, the matters of civilian-military relations has been confined to the executive branch. However, during this same period, divergent electoral preferences became evident as well.

Not Just a Culture Clash...

Again applying a broad brush, during the 1990s, military service members began demonstrating a consistent preference for and self-identification as conservative Republican. Separately, by the end of the 2000s, civilian government workers had become a key constituency for liberal Democrats.

Nominally, the preferences dovetail with the political platforms of the two parties -- Republicans have historically favored a muscular foreign policy while Democrats have been longtime advocates of greater governmental regulation.

However, parochial matters are a factor as well and, in the end, two key populations central to the operations and functions of the American government have become key voting blocs and special interests firmly ensconced in opposing political parties.

The philosophical affinity to the party is reinforced by an exchange of votes for benefits and vice-versa and both the affinity and patronage are cemented when defended against the countervailing priorities of the opposing party and its constituencies.

In the emergent battle over the 2012 budget, the 2012 Republican blueprint has taken the defense budget off the table and Democrats refuse to explore any substantial reductions to the size of government.

Acknowledged, genuinely held and diametrically opposing viewpoints regarding the role of government do indeed separate the parties, but this rigidity is destroying possibilities for much needed compromise.

Witness the fallout from the recent political face-off over the 2011 budget.

Messes, Consequences, and Opportunities

On April 18th, independent ratings agency Standard and Poors announced, “the material risk that U.S. policymakers might not reach an agreement on how to address medium- and long-term budgetary challenges by 2013” led it revise its outlook downward from “stable” to “negative”.

While the Standard and Poors was merely warning investors, the act demonstrated
how such gridlock is closely watched by third parties who recognize clearly, more so than the actual participants, the consequences.

In an era of uncertainty in the international security environment, warnings are rarely provided. Heaven help the Republic if its adversaries were to recognize the opportunities.

Beyond The Opportunity Costs of $1 Million Tomahawks

2011-03-31T19:28:00.000-07:00

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On March 19, American-led allied forces initiated Operation Odyssey Dawn to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and implement an authorized no-fly zone over Libya and to use all means necessary short of foreign occupation to protect civilians. One facet of the operation has received attention to a degree not previously raised in similarly small-scale interventions -- cost -- as coinciding news coverage and analysis has been substantial. The costs of military operations are hardly peripheral to their execution, but rarely has such an exercise of power been so immediately scrutinized in fiscal terms. The attention may indeed be one of the rare constructive legacies arising from the American invasion of Iraq, but it also may signify a broader (and overdue) readiness to recalibrate the expectations and responsibilities placed on the federal government.

Cost of the No-Fly Zone in Terms of What is Known

On March 9, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) issued a report identifying cost estimates against options ranging from “full no-fly zone” to “stand-off no-fly zone”; the corresponding estimates ranged from $100 to $300 million per week to $15 to $25 million per week. CSBA based the estimate on earlier similar undertakings, principally Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch over Iraq following the Persian Gulf War in 1991. CSBA produced the analysis to inform decision-making and illustrate available options.

However, as evidenced by subsequent news coverage, the estimate has been used to demonstrate the cost in terms of foregone priorities, specifically deficit reduction.

Evoking President Eisenhower's lament about how military expenditures could have funded hospital and school construction for a decade, operations in Libya have already been criticized for impinging on the (meager) budget reductions already enacted by the new Congress.

According to the January 2011 Congressional Budget Office's "The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2011 to 2021" (PDF), deficits that will accumulate under current law will increase the federal debt to significantly higher levels. In FY2009, debt totaled less than $6 trillion, or about 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), conversely in the FY2010, the debt approximated $9 trillion, or 62 percent of GDP, and by the end of 2021, is projected to total $18 trillion, or 77 percent of GDP.

To date, Congress has only succeeded in reducing planned government spending by approximately $10 billion. The Democratic President has declined to present a budget for consideration and the Republican House of Representatives continues to face off with the Democratic Senate over $61 billion in proposed total reductions.

Regardless of which side prevails, proposed reductions are nowhere near what is required to address the debt crisis.

Returning to CBO projections, interest payments on the debt will "skyrocket" over the next decade. In a December 2010 report, the CBO stated net interest outlays in 2010 totaled $197 billion, or 1.4 percent of GDP.

Stated alternatively, proposed reductions are only 31 percent of interest payments on the debt alone.

Present interest rates are at historic lows -- and they will inevitably rise. By 2020, the combination of rising debt and rising interest rates could result in net interest payments rising to nearly $778 billion, or 3.4 percent of GDP. That figure is 17 percent greater than the Administration’s proposed defense budget of $663.8 billion for FY2010.

And this is the foreseeable future...

Cost of the No-Fly Zone in Terms of What is Unknown

On March 11, 2011, Japan suffered a a 9.0-magnitude earthquake, which triggered extremely destructive tsunami waves of up to 77 feet minutes after the quake, in some cases traveling up to 6 miles inland.

To date, the Japanese National Police Agency has officially confirmed 11,168 deaths, 2,778 injured, and 16,407 people missing across eighteen prefectures, as well as over 125,000 buildings damaged or destroyed. The earthquake and tsunami caused extensive and severe structural damage in Japan, including heavy damage to roads and railways, fires in many areas, a dam collapse, and explosions at three nuclear reactors.

Early estimates placed insured losses from the earthquake alone at US$14.5 to $34.6 billion. The Bank of Japan offered ¥15 trillion (US$183 billion) to the banking system on 14 March in an effort to normalize market conditions. On 21 March, the World Bank estimated damage between US$122 billion and $235 billion.

Japan's government said the cost of the earthquake and tsunami that devastated the northeast could reach $309 billion, making it the world's most expensive natural disaster on record. Estimates of the earthquake's magnitude make it the most powerful known earthquake to have hit Japan, and one of the five most powerful earthquakes in the world overall since modern record-keeping began in 1900.

Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan stated, "In the 65 years after the end of World War II, this is the toughest and the most difficult crisis for Japan."

The suddenness and staggering impact of the disaster led two scholars to characterize the earthquake as “Japan’s Black Swan,” employing the label popularized by Lebanese theoretician Nassim Nicholas Taleb.

The earthquake was indeed such an event, but the increasing frequency with which these rare and high impact events have occurred since Taleb published his eponymous book on the phenomenon should give the American body politic pause.

As successive black swan events (the attacks on September 11th, Hurricane Katrina, the economic collapse of 2008) have demonstrated, the present political leadership is incapable of reorienting the government to cope with such contingencies.

To date, the country has been fortunate black swan events have been singular ones. As a recent March 2011 Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report tactfully observed, "U.S. policymakers have not sufficiently considered the impact of limited finances and stretched military capabilities on crisis response in a systematic way, or planned for crises that strike in such quick succession."

Time to Identify What Is Necessary and Sufficient

To be direct, if the country were to suffer multiple emergencies simultaneously, it would be an unprecedented catastrophe -- one that would impair the nation’s future for a generation.

The CNAS report counseled decision-makers to be prepared to weigh the "opportunity costs" of matters peripheral to U.S. interests, but the present circumstances demand a more exacting determination of what will be necessary and sufficient to secure the nation’s well-being into the future.

Acknowledged -- such a proscription is more easily stated than accomplished.

As black swan events cannot be predicted or avoided, Taleb advised minimizing risk, instituting redundancy, and simplifying where possible.

Unfortunately, the nation’s political elite have rarely questioned the expansive functions assigned to American government, even though such expansion has only exacerbated risks (through uncontrolled spending), abetted needless duplication (via the proliferation of bureaucracy and regulations), and complicated routine matters needlessly (see health care and tax code).

Beyond programmatic and spending reductions, decision-makers should be pursuing the comprehensive rationalization of governmental structures and processes and the general retrenchment of roles and responsibilities assumed in the past fifty years.

The Simpson-Bowles Deficit Commission recommendations have received few endorsements, but their breadth provides a benchmark for evaluating the sincerity of decision-makers. If a decision-maker fails to match or exceed their recommendations, they are simply not serious about the crisis facing the nation.

The 2010 election marked a key milestone toward installing new political leadership toward realizing this end. While Tea Party foreign policy inclinations may remain indeterminate, the movement has been consistent and, to date, has evinced a commitment to fiscal prudence that will (hopefully) translate into more judicious use of American power abroad -- where penny-pinching precision munitions is peripheral to the debate.

For additional reading, see
03/28/11 CRS R41725 "Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress"
04/01/11 Aviation Week, Ares, Libya: NATO Contributions (By The Numbers)

PRC 2023: The Now or Never Moment on Taiwan

2011-02-27T18:31:00.000-08:00

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In January 2011, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) concluded a summit following a year marked by growing apprehension over the nature of the latter's dramatic rise. Numerous matters tested the US-PRC relationship in 2010 (North Korea, the Yellow Sea, disputes with Japan over territory) and President Hu Jintao grasped the summit as an opportunity to assuage concerns. On January 20, speaking to the U.S.-China Business Council President Hu declared "[China] will remain committed to the path of peaceful development. We do not engage in an arms race, we are not a military threat to any country. China will never seek to dominate or pursue an expansionist policy." Declarations aside, the question remains whether the PRC's certain to grow capabilities will lead future leadership to revisit their presently stated benign intentions. Moreover, as Mr. Ely Ratner of RAND succinctly pointed out in the Winter 2011 issue of Washington Quarterly, strategies articulated by the leadership will inevitably be influenced by prevailing constraints as well as a rapidly evolving and uncertain future security environment. Demography may not necessarily be destiny, but in the 2023-2032 time frame, the PRC leadership may conclude a now or never moment faces the country on a key priority -- reunification with Taiwan -- as a surplus of young males will coincide with the onset of the general population's aging.

When Priorities Clash With Realities

A 2009 RAND report summarized the three priorities of contemporary PRC foreign policy: promoting economic development, protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and generating international respect and status. While seemingly benign, these three priorities (particularly the latter two) are premised on the following historical experiences: the "century of humiliations" endured in the 1800s, the recurrent exploitation of internal weaknesses by foreign powers, and the recent "reclamation" of major power status on the regional and world stage.

Critical to this reclamation is sustaining momentum while minimizing perceptions of a "China threat". Complicating this effort is the PRC's attempt to undermine the legitimacy of an independent Taiwan with an eye toward eventual reunification. In practice, however, "China’s approach to the Taiwan question, which can be inflexible and aggressive at times, undermines its ability to appear moderate and benign."

In the case of China, the firm statement of intentions and rational expectations they inspire will inevitably come up against extraordinary circumstances. As the aforementioned Mr. Ratner submitted: “Beijing is undoubtedly amassing the means to exert influence in international politics, but regardless of its strategic intentions today, its rapidly evolving threat environment will play a decisive role in determining how China brings these resources to bear. … [its] capabilities will likely be employed in contingencies and ways that Chinese strategists are neither aspiring to, nor necessarily even considering, today.”

In the case of Chinese demography, though, an anxious international community can anticipate an environment more foreseeable than others.

Coinciding Demographic Challenges for China

According to U.S. Census Bureau data on the Chinese population, the PRC will contend with the confluence of two major demographic challenges beginning in 2023.

First, the aging of China. Even as the PRC attained the ranking of world’s second largest economy in 2010, numerous scholars (Nicholas Eberstadt, Neil Howe, Richard Jackson) have amply demonstrated how China will likely become old before it becomes rich. As China has modernized, two familiar consequences have followed -- a declining fertility rate coupled with rising longevity. However, in the PRC, the government compounded the impact by encouraging couples to limit family size, eventually introducing the “one child policy” with a system of birth permits, targets, and penalties to enforce it.

Accordingly, in one generation China will grow old to a degree it took Europe to age between 1930 and 2030. Unfortunately, the PRC will not have accrued the national wealth or established commensurate social insurance systems to cope with the eventual number of seniors. According to U.S. Census Bureau data, the elderly population aged 60-64 will increase from 72.8 million to 112.8 million between 2023 and 2032, while the younger population aged 35-39 will decrease from 109.6 million to 94.6 million during the same period. More dauntingly, Chinese seniors will have far less family members to rely on and will have few employment options not entailing rigorous physical labor.

CHART 1

Second, the growing surplus of males in China. Scholars Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. den Boer have been exploring the potentially fearsome consequences of sex selection practices in Asian countries since 2002. In the PRC, the pursuit of the “one-child” policy has inadvertently permitted the preference for male heirs to result in unhealthy male-to-female ratios. Ironically, this societal preference for males will produce a sizable subclass of young males unable to find a wife and start a family; these men are currently known as guang gun-er or "bare branches." Hudson and den Boer cite the work of sociologists demonstrating that young adult men with no stake in society are much more prone to attempt to improve their situation through violent and criminal behavior in a strategy of coalitional aggression with other bare branches. The responses available to governments can be problematic -- between socially re-engineering and repression, the former is too costly while the latter would shatter the veneer of a "peaceful rise" carefully crafted by the leadership. According to U.S. Census Bureau data, the surplus male population in the PRC will total more than 24.8 million in 2023 and remain above that level for the next decade before beginning to decline again.

CHART 2

The prospect of failing to attain the level of economic development before its elderly population places an unbearable strain on the country’s economy while simultaneously coping with tens of millions of idle and alienated young men may present the vaunted PRC technocracy with a challenge beyond its capabilities. As Hudson and den Boer ominously warn, “At some point, governments [will] consider how they can export their problem, either by encouraging emigration of young adult men or harnessing their energies in martial adventures abroad.”

The Precedent

Since 1989, the population’s continuing acceptance of the nation’s authoritarian leadership is apparently premised solely on the leadership’s ability to sustain high rates of economic growth. Fatefully, however, the leadership has sought to augment its legitimacy by simultaneously appealing to nationalism. If the leadership fails to achieve the necessary economic growth to assure the future of surplus males or the security of an aging population, it will face a grave threat to its legitimacy and may turn to overtly aggressive nationalism as a corrective.

The present governing elite act is extremely anxious and monitors all nationalist outpourings very closely to ensure public anger does not rage out of control. However, in the 2023-2032 period, PRC leadership may conclude whipping up nationalist fervor would be a reasonable gamble. Instead of dealing with the prospect of an aged population foiling economic plans and disaffected bare branches disrupting the peace, the leadership may ultimately decide to rally the nation -- validate the Middle Kingdom’s reclamation of great power status or forgo reunification for another century -- and make a bid to reclaim Taiwan by force.

A fantastic scenario, but consider the decision by Imperial Japan in 1941 to declare war against the United States despite the overwhelming industrial and military strength of the latter. Seemingly another example of the irrational Shinto nationalism with which Japanese militarist leaders were enthralled, the decision, in retrospect, reflected more rational calculations than originally concluded.

In a masterful examination of Japan’s decision for war in 1941, Dr. Jeffrey Record demonstrates how the U.S.-Japanese war in the Pacific resulted from miscalculations on both sides. Dr. Record readily acknowledges Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the war, but asserts the specific decision to wage war in 1941 “was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States.”

Dr. Record explains how differing cultures cannot share a common standard of rationality, especially in bilateral relationships marred by cultural ignorance and racial overtones. In the case of America vis-à-vis Japan, expectations for rationally grounded deterrence blinded decision-makers to the provocations inherent in their acts. The oil embargo didn’t deter the Japanese as much as it provoked them. The Japanese leadership concluded acceding to U.S. demands were unacceptable as yielding would essentially entail renouncing great power status, which Dr. Record notes no self-respecting government would ever do. However, to stand still and do nothing as well would mean collapse. Faced with such alternatives, national self-respect will always trump concerns as to winnability. Dr. Record aptly states: “War—even a lost war—was clearly preferable to humiliation and starvation.”

Around the year 2023, PRC leadership may similarly assert similar alternatives facing the nation.

Challenge for the United States

While entirely speculative, the exercise actually underscores the shortcomings of various approaches espoused by those with varying expectations for the future of US-PRC relations.

Forecasters of an adversarial PRC recommend bolstering military capabilities to counter expected anti-access strategems. Specifically, skeptics would augment and accelerate air and naval asset acquisition to ensure an advantage over the PRC. The recommendation is premised on the expectation the PRC would refrain given its disadvantage. However, as Dr. Record points out, in 1941 Japan correctly projected how existing naval and air armament programs would never approximate future U.S. force structure and concluded Japan's relative position would only worsen if a preventive attack was not undertaken. Instead of dissuading Japan, the advantage convinced its leadership to act immediately -- as a preventive measure.

Proponents of a responsible, if not friendly, PRC point to the deep economic interdependence between the United States and China. Principally, optimists assert the mutual benefit arising from the deepening US-PRC economic relationship will preclude conflict. Conceding that hostility cannot be completely ruled out, optimists deflect concerns over US indebtedness to the PRC by citing John Maynard Keynes -- ““If I owe you a pound, I have a problem; but if I owe you a million, the problem is yours.” If push came to shove, the U.S. could simply threaten to devalue PRC debt holding. The caveat is again identified by Dr. Record; the Roosevelt Administration enacted the oil embargo as a punitive measure short of military action. Unfortunately, President Roosevelt and his team failed to understand such a debilitating sanction was tantamount to an act of war. Indeed, the embargo highlighted the nation’s vulnerability arising from the economic relationship and persuaded them military action was imperative.

Given the potential for even divergent courses of action to result in war, the outlook would appear bleak. Fortunately, one of Dr. Record’s observations is eminently relevant -- “there is no substitute for knowledge of a potential adversary’s history and culture.” In that bolstering capabilities and banking on interdependence is dependent on the perspective of the other party, Dr. Record’s observation (one echoed by many other respected scholars and commentators) can be addressed unilaterally and improve US foreign policy universally.

If this deficiency is not remedied and the above scenario were to come true, then a modicum of responsibility for such a conflict could be assigned to the United States.

Unready

2011-01-18T08:27:00.000-08:00

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The close of 2010 witnesses an America far removed from the auspiciousness on display at end of the last decade. Addressing the American people on January 27, 2000, President William Clinton triumphantly declared “We are fortunate to be alive at this moment in history. Never before has our Nation enjoyed, at once, so much prosperity and social progress with so little internal crisis and so few external threats. ” President Clinton proclaimed the State of the Union simply – “[it] is the strongest it has ever been.” Within 18 months, America awoke to horror of jetliners crashing into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by a cadre of suicidal Islamic extremists. The event closed the period “between the wars” and inaugurated America's global war on terrorism. Nine years later, one finds an America weary of wars in faraway lands, impatient with a stagnant economy, and anxious about ascendant powers ready to demand a share of global leadership once held exclusively. In a humbling close to the decade, the United States could not prevent a collection of hackers revealing its confidential diplomatic dealings. While this episode did not have the tragic cost of Osama bin Laden's terrorist attack, Julian Assange and his release of classified American government documents via Wikileaks demonstrated more emphatically what should have been evident even at the zenith of its power – the American government is unready for the twenty-first century.

I.

Established in 1988, Al Qaeda emerged as the prototype adversary of the United States in the 1990s. Unlike traditional belligerents in the twentieth century, Al Qaeda was a non-state actor. While initially guided strategically and ideologically by Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda is now essentially leaderless. Al Qaeda endures as a decentralized network of autonomous affiliates operating independently. As demonstrated by the attacks on September 11, 2001, in the United States, and on March 11, 2004, in Spain, Al Qaeda establishes focused strategic aims and then explores and employs the most effectual tactics available, usually small teams relying on unsophisticated or improvised technology. Lastly, Al Qaeda presents a specific narrative across a wide variety of media (especially the Internet) that galvanizes its intended (and immeasurable) audience while simultaneously confounding its adversary as to countermeasures. In its present configuration, Al Qaeda constitutes a networked insurgency capable of striking globally and premised on subverting the prevailing international order.

With the attacks of September 11, Osama bin Laden sought to provoke a conflict between the West, led by the United States, and the Islamic world. Bin Laden wagered America would retreat or lead (what would appear to be) a Western assault against Islamism. If the former occurred, bin Laden would begin toppling Arab regimes abandoned in the wake of America’s withdrawal. If the latter happened, a war would be propagandized as a call to jihad, as it had been during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, ensnaring another superpower in a debilitating Central Asian quagmire. Either way, bin Laden believed the ensuing conflagration would end successfully in favor of militant Islam and permit the re-establishment of the Caliphate.

Where bin Laden erred was in attacking the entirety of the American polity - the citizenry, its elites, and its government.

Insurgency theory holds that insurgencies succeed by separating the targeted population from the governing entity. In targeting a “global” population of like minded individuals, attacking the international system’s hegemonic entity (e.g. the United States) makes sense. However, the international system is still an anarchic system -- the United States may be the hegemon, but it is not a global sovereign authority. In this regard, attacking all components of the governing entity -- its government and its citizenry -- only ensured the entire American polity would unite in favor of retaliation.

Moreover, an attack on the entire polity precludes opportunities to garner sympathy among the American citizenry. In Europe, Hamas and Hezbollah have succeeded in winning support from segments of the population sympathetic to Palestinian aspirations. Instead, the scale of bloodshed only unifies the country, ensuring support for retribution was universally supported. FN1

Like Al Qaeda, Wikileaks is an assemblage of networked insurgents; its preferred domain is cyberspace and employs information and its’ release as a weapon in itself.

However, the recent Wikileaks gambit was far more sophisticated. In contrast to Al Qaeda, Wikileaks targeted the US government as a distinct entity from the American people.

According to current polling demonstrates, the American public is at odds with -- if not outright alienated from -- the nation’s political elite: “sixty-nine percent (69%) of the political class believe the United States is generally heading in the right direction, while 78% of mainstream voters think the country is going down the wrong track.”

The divergence marks a culmination of the American public’s skepticism that first emerged after the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. During those episodes, the American public discovered the government was restricting information not to protect national interests but to conceal illicit activities. The means by which the American public learned about such lies -- the leaking of the Pentagon Papers and tips from Deep Throat -- established the moral precedent for divulging confidential government information.

Wikileaks attempts to capitalize on this precedent by asserting the release of government secrets are undertaken in the name of “safely getting the truth out” and greater transparency.

To date, the release of confidential diplomatic information has not resulted in the deaths of any American citizens. As such, the public do not necessarily share the government’s urgency in addressing the challenge posed by Wikileaks and the public’s disapproval has varied.

According to a December 2010 Washington Post-ABC News poll, younger Americans, more accustomed to the unbounded transparency afforded by the Internet, have even signaled less disapproval. More pointedly, the broader public is more accepting when the released documentation concerns current US military operations.

While the American public have generally disapproved of the Wikileaks release, the reaction has hardly been as vociferous or unanimous as that of the post-September 11 response.

Except, Mr. Assange is not interested in greater transparency: “our goal [is not] to achieve a more transparent society; it's our goal to achieve a more just society."

Ultimately, Mr. Assange’s aim is the collapse of the American government.

As interpreted by Berkeley blogger Aaron Bady, Mr. Assange believes the American government constitutes a conspiracy and to emasculate it, one has to corrupt the sources of information on which it relies. The conspiracy only thrives by possessing and assessing information in excess of the common citizenry’s capabilities. By releasing the sequestered information, Mr. Assange expects a conspiracy to respond by limiting flows of information in and out of its domain. If Mr. Assange and Wikileaks can successfully leak more information, then the conspiracy's suspicions will rise as its confidence declines in existing information, leading the conspiracy to place even more restrictions on information flows. Inevitably, the conspiracy collapses as it has less and less access to reliable information and becomes incapable of responding to changing conditions.

Has the American government defied Mr. Assange's expectations?

In the immediate wake of the Wikileaks disclosures, agency leaders directed government employees to refrain from accessing or reading the leaked documentation outside of a classified network. The step essentially deprived government employees of knowledge now freely available to common citizens as well as foreigners.

More broadly, the Obama Administration’s Office of Management and Budget issued a memorandum on 01/03/2011, directing agencies to assess information security policies by 01/28. The guidance recommended due diligence more reflective of intelligence community security practices, such as identifying potential “insider threats,” detecting “behavioral changes”, measuring “trustworthiness,” and using psychiatrists and sociologists to monitor happiness and grumpiness (PDF PG 9).

As Steven Aftergood at Secrecy News noted, the net effect is “a kind of evolutionary pressure” on the government. Because Wikileaks has greater success acquiring information from government agencies with lax security, like the military services, versus those with robust protocols, like the intelligence community, the government will respond to the breach by make the Army more like the CIA.

By failing to understand Mr. Assange’s intentions, the American government is unwittingly playing into his hands by having government agencies to emulate the CIA.

Acknowledged, the agency has been the foundation of American intelligence activities since 1945 and has been responsible for a variety of celebrated -- and uncelebrated -- triumphs. However, the agency has also been responsible for a number of American foreign policy disasters.

In the aftermath of recent intelligence failures, such as the failure to anticipate the attacks on September 11 or the misjudgment of Iraqi weapons programs, American political leaders have undertaken comprehensive reforms to address key deficiencies, such as the dearth of information sharing or lack of accountability.

However, authorizing greater data-sharing or naming a government-wide director will not improve intelligence.

As Robert Jervis of Columbia University demonstrates in his latest book, Why Intelligence Fails, improved intelligence would actually be less determinate and more qualified in its conclusions. More critically, Jervis asserts "better intelligence would not have led to an effective policy," an argument he acknowledges is "psychologically disturbing and politically unacceptable" because improved intelligence would entail greater uncertainty than is currently appreciated and would shift the responsibility for future failures to the elected political leadership.

In short, by seeking to apply information security policies practiced by the intelligence community, the US government will become more insular, beginning the vicious circle desired by Mr. Assange.

II.

Mr. Assange's approach should not have been all that unfamiliar to American leaders.

Mr. Assange’s recognition an entity is only as potent as its access to information echoies US Air Force COL John Boyd's insights on warfare. COL Boyd elaborated on how an entity's ability to survive amidst uncertainty depends on the continuous flow of information and the ability to process and interpret information at a tempo greater than any adversary. Above all, COL Boyd emphasized an organization should be agile and adaptive and should concurrently deny an adversary an opportunity to be agile and adaptive in response.

COL Boyd’s genius influenced many, principally those in the military, but unfortunately, he was considered a maverick and he languishes in obscurity save for the keepers of his flame within the U.S. Marine Corps and pockets of national security intellectuals. Outside the military, very few in America’s elites are aware of his insights and the importance of organizational adaptability.

And it shows.

According to Walter Russell Mead, Editor-at-Large of The American Interest magazine, the nation has everything necessary for success in the twenty-first century with one exception – “a critical mass of thinkers, analysts and policy entrepreneurs who can help unleash the creative potential of the American people and build the new government and policy structures that will facilitate a new wave of private-sector led growth.”

Mead asserts the greatest challenge is not the nation's gargantuan debt or changes in the international security environment, but the inability of the nation's leading intellectuals and professionals to divest themselves of outmoded social models.

After vividly dissecting their “reactionary” posture, Mead closes witheringly:

Those who run our government agencies, our universities, our foundations, our mainstream media outlets and other key institutions cannot at this point look the future in the face. The world is moving in ways so opposed to their most hallowed assumptions that they simply cannot make sense of it. They resist blindly and uncreatively and, unable to appreciate the extraordinary prospects for human liberation that this change can bring, they are incapable of creative and innovative response.

Such is the disposition that leads a nation from “the strongest it has ever been” to unprecedented impotence and vulnerability in the face of a single individual's hostile intent.

III.

Instead of fulfilling Mr. Assange’s predictions, American elites should be exploring how to harness the full power of the technological revolution in the name of rationalizing the state, maximizing information flows of all kinds, opening up once-closed services, and cultivating the next wave of leaders.

Is their cause for optimism in the next generation?

Mr. Assange’s antics may have closed 2010, but the year belonged to Mark Zuckerberg, founder of Facebook, according to Time magazine.

As has been ubiquitously reported, Zuckerberg’s Facebook phenomenon now features 550 million members, one of every twelve people in the world. While Facebook also contends privacy and transparency-related controversies, Zuckerberg emphasizes not alleged conspiracies or ossified elites, but trust and its possibilities:

"We're trying to map out what exists in the world. In the world, there's trust. I think as humans we fundamentally parse the world through the people and relationships we have around us. So at its core, what we're trying to do is map out all of those trust relationships...”

Aspiring American leaders devoted to ensuring an American government ready for the twenty-first century could do no better than to attempt the same.

FN1 In this regard, Al Qaeda’s attack on 9/11 was equivalent to Nazi Germany’s Operation Barbarossa. Nazi obesiance to theories of racial superiority prevailed over opportunities to win over an oppressed Soviet population. The 9/11 attacks, like Operation Barbarossa, were also inspired by a fantasy ideology and ignored the prevailing strategic reality.

Furthermore, while Osama bin Laden succeeded in inspiring insurgents around the world and the United States has sacrificed extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is manifestly distinct from the Soviet Union. An economically vibrant democracy, the United States will survive where an economically sclerotic Soviet autocracy could not. Even if the United States withdraws from Afghanistan without achieving its objectives, any future attacks of the same design would only spur a more determined re-engagement.

NOTES

03/2010, Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War

12/06/2010, L. Gordon Crovitz, "Julian Assange, Information Anarchist," Wall Street Journal

12/08/2010, Walter Russell Mead, "The Crisis of the American Intellectual," The American Interest

Secrecy News, Steven Aftergood