“It is not to be expected that human nature will change in a day; perhaps it is too much to expect that the age-old institution of war … will be at once abolished…”
Frank B. Kellogg, American Secretary of State
Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech
“We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth that we will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes.”
Barack H. Obama, American President
Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech
"Only the dead have seen the end of war."
Attributed to Plato
Former Secretary of State Frank Kellogg accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his work establishing the Pact of Paris, in which the sixty-four signatories to the treaty renounced war as an instrument of national policy. Kellogg characterized the pact as a “sacred promise between all nations and to all peoples” to forswear war in settling their differences. Awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to President Barack Obama was premised on what the committee described as his “extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples,” with special citation given to his call for a world without nuclear weapons. Obama acknowledged the debates spurred by the Nobel Committee’s decision and devoted considerable time to justifying the awarding of a peace prize to a leader presiding over a nation at war in two countries. Obama answered by reiterating the principle of a just war and identifying the dilemma of all peacemakers – war is always tragic but sometimes necessary. Eighty years separate the sentiment of two American idealists celebrating the pursuit of peace, but the few words attributed to an ancient Greek philosopher more succinctly captured a lasting truth about human nature and the resolution of conflict. The grandeur and prestige of accepting the Nobel Peace Prize lends itself to the sweeping pronouncements of idealism such as those issued by Kellogg and Obama, but the immutable constant of human affairs will remain the occasional recourse to violence and war.
When Kellogg proclaimed his lofty aspirations, the Great War from 1914 to 1918 marked the first major conflict among the period's great powers in over a century. International organizations were newly established and the
Eighty years later, Obama can point to no similar institution or treaty establishing a corresponding consensus to eschew war.
More worrisome, the capacity of the states to foreclose the resort to violence, even if so desired, is rapidly diminishing and the sentiment to forswear war does not even exist. The utility of war, warfare, and violence remains, despite an anticipated “end of history”, and American leaders and policymakers continue grasping for constructs and concepts that will make sense of the future and inform future courses of action.
War: The Immutable Constant
In the present day, the American experience in
As noted previously, the 2006 Lebanon War has emerged as a touchstone for both reformers and traditionalists. Counterinsurgency doctrine proponents have pointed to Hezbollah’s unexpected success against the vaunted Israeli conventional military machine as proof of the need to continuing developing counterinsurgency capabilities. Conversely, conventional warfare advocates claim Hezbollah’s adoption of conventional tactics demonstrates the continued importance of preparing for traditional force-on-force combat operations.
The debate has reached an impasse, stalling with an apparent inability to explore options beyond the false “either/or dichotomy” of counterinsurgency versus conventional warfare. Counterinsurgency proponents want the American military to continue honing its ability to safeguard populations. Conventional advocates want American warfighters to retain the impulse to destroy the enemy.
A potential bridge has been submitted under the “hybrid warfare” thesis, which holds the evolution of warfare will entail the simultaneous implementation of conventional and irregular tactics by ever increasingly sophisticated enemies, whether state or sub-state. The Department of Defense has accepted the premise and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has indicated hybrid warfare will inform the development of the analytical framework supporting the department’s Quadrennial Defense Review – “…this will be the first QDR able to fully incorporate the numerous lessons learned on the battlefield these past few years. … the distinction between high-end and low-end war, between mechanized battles and stability operations, are blurring to the point where the old definitions of conventional and unconventional are no longer useful. War in the future will often be a hybrid blend of tactics.”
While the examination of new concepts and approaches is positive, the current course may lead to a conceptual dead end.
As currently defined, hybrid warfare is a concept whose breadth comes perilously close to undermining its instructive utility. According to a key proponent of the construct, a hybrid threat is “any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives.” The expansive definition appropriately widens the aperture of national security threats beyond the preceding two major regional conflict construct that had previously governed overall defense planning, but simply does not provide the criteria necessary to discriminate and prioritize among the very many potential adversaries out there capable of implementing such combinations.
If war remains war (and warfare remains warfare) as antagonists, belligerents, objectives, and innovations emerge and fade, then what constructs can inform contemporary national security planning?
War Is Nothing But A Duel On A Larger Scale
Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s simple but enduring maxim immortally established war as a duel. Accordingly, a continuum of warfare between protagonists and antagonists, from the past to the future, becomes evident when examining two fundamental and closely aligned trends:
1) The decreasing ability of the protagonist to know the identity of its antagonist
2) The decreasing opportunity for the protagonist to retaliate with decisive violent action against an antagonist
Familiarity Breeds Contempt
From man’s first decision to aggress against his neighbor through the centuries, a protagonist always knew the antagonist. From tribes contesting fertile lands to Greek poleis battling for peninsular supremacy to the Roman conquest of the known world to the endless internecine wars in medieval
With the advent of the Westphalian era, tribes and feudal fiefdoms were supplanted by states as the principal political unit in international affairs. In seventeenth century
At the end of the eighteenth century, the overthrow of the monarchy during the French Revolution and its incitement of nationalism, among many forces, transformed the state into the nation-state. This entity – a sovereign political unit inhabited predominantly by a relatively homogeneous group of people sharing a common culture, history, and language – has endured to the present day. Moreover, the acquired monopoly over the exercise of violence within defined geographic territories and highly institutionalized capacity to undertake war essentially narrowed the identity of protagonists and antagonists to nation-states and their governed populations for this period. The history of war during this latter portion of the Westphalian period has primarily entailed warfare between neighboring nation-states.
(States did wage war in remote locations, but mostly as colonial expeditions against technologically backward cultures. The use of force usually occurred if the initial encounter met with violent resistance from the indigenous authorities. Thereafter, subsequent wars would then follow the above pattern – the population and territory next door would become the next likeliest object of aggression.)
The future of the Westphalian period has come into doubt because the pre-eminent position the nation-states has held on the international stage has begun to wane as other actors have begun to rapidly accrue the ability to provide services on par with the state – in part because of the success the state has had in serving as a vehicle for collective action.
A key innovation in the evolution of the nation-state was Imperial Germany’s decision to institute social insurance programs in the late nineteenth century, partly to address upheavals induced by the new industrial economy and partly to undermine the growing political strength of socialism. As with the French example, the degree to which such initiatives bolstered the authority, domain, and cohesion of the nation-state inspired similar imitation in all major modern industrial economies.
In the twentieth century, democratic capitalist states had to contend with the alternative presented by totalitarian fascist and authoritarian communist states. Unfortunately, fascist and communist governance unfortunately resulted in horrific tragedies and the experience demonstrated the peril of assigning the state unbounded authority over its citizenry; the challenge ended with the implosion of the
Nevertheless, intervention in the economy and social engineering experiments were still considered valid state endeavors in democratic capitalist countries -- despite the tragic record of these alternatives -- and modern government became increasingly cumbersome as it expanded and eventually unable to address the resulting systemic deficits incurred by such intervention and experimentation.
Moreover, by the time the democratic capitalist state model had outlasted these alternatives, technology (in particular, transportation, communication, and information) and globalization had progressed enough to the point where private, transnational, non-national, and sub-state actors could now deliver goods and services once the domain of sovereign states – from education to health care – and more effectively. Because the state structures and regulations of each geographic territory in the international political economy were increasingly homogenized – since the world has become “flat” – many non-state actors (corporation, association, insurgency, an individual) at any scale (global, national, or local) were free to aggregate and mobilize resources parallel to the state and began providing these goods and services just as, if not more, effectively.
More ominously, such actors soon demonstrated the ability to prepare for and wage war as well. The most notorious contemporary examples include Aum Shirinkyo, A.Q. Khan's proliferation network, and Al Qaeda.
In fact, circumstances permit non-state entities to pursue a range of objectives while actively avoiding statehood. Statelessness has become increasingly feasible (and attractive) if a group wants to pursue a broad spectrum of objectives, especially at the expense of a hostile nation-state. Competing against and weakening, disrupting, or de-legitimizing a state is enough, because doing so creates the space for non-state groups to function and gain the modicum of authority and access to the resources necessary to pursue its next objective. More importantly, to be stateless is to decrease one’s own footprint, to decrease one’s chance of being a target of retaliation, and thereby to increase one’s odds of survival. To return to the aforementioned 2006 Lebanon War, Hezbollah would routinely present
The close of the Westphalian era means wide-ranging economic and security interests will inevitably place a nation-state at odds with not only the interests and values of other nation-states, but also an ever increasing growing number of groups and individuals around the world. Moreover, future antagonists can and will remain essentially anonymous until the moment to wage war is chosen – most critically, to the general population, who provide the manpower requested by the state to defend it.
In the immediacy of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Americans asked “why do they hate us?” but struggled when specifying who the "they" was. The United States government and informed observers knew of Al Qaeda's 1998 fatwa against the United States, but when calls for a declaration of war were considered, the rebuttal of “against who” was telling. The nation had just lost nearly 3,000 people in the most audacious terrorist strike ever and the nation's representatives, those constitutionally empowered to declare war, did not specify exactly who to go to war against.
In September 2007, the United States Senate passed a non-binding designating the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the internal organ of a sovereign state, as a terrorist organization; separate Google searches for leadership and capabilities of the IRGC against government and military URLs return sparse results for an organization in the nation's military crosshairs.
The race between a state's military establishment and the enemy unfolds in real time as the Internet has facilitated the phenomenon of “open-source warfare” whereby hostile groups and individuals anywhere can and do publish, share, and download the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures available. In December 2009, Stars and Stripes, the US military's newspaper, published stories online within three days of each other relating how the Army was adapting its main training center to contend with roadside improvised explosive devices while Afghan insurgents were adopting a new tactic – killing soldiers with secondary bombs after they dismount to inspect an IED explosion. (The stories did not includes links to each other.)
In August 2007,
On the horizon lies the prospect of darknetted adversaries. A darknet is a system that runs on networks via a software layer and hardware infrastructure and is constructed in a way that makes it opaque to outside observation and impervious to non-members or intrusion. A darknet can be parasitic or additive to the global environment – or more effectively, both. Finally, a darknet competes with other entities that operate within the global environment, from nation-states to corporations to associations to insurgencies to other darknets, and anonymously so. Once the domain of the technically proficient, darknets are now available to anyone.
Ultimately, for any protagonist (i.e. the
Not Until You See The Whites Of Their Eyes
Returning to the moment when man first decided to appease his greed, fears, or pride over the objection of others, he soon discovered the surest way was to employ violent force.
At first, man had only his bare hands; only with clenched fists and nails drawn could man draw blood and coerce his enemy. In time, and with some thought and improvisation, man realized rocks and sticks could be fashioned into weapons and wielded to great effect in a confrontation. To gain advantage over adversaries wielding rocks and sticks, man soon developed skills crafting iron and bronze into knives and swords. To gain advantage over adversaries wielding swords, man took to wheeled chariots and building city walls and designing battering rams and catapults and mounting horses and elephants -- anything and everything that would give him an edge over his enemy. More importantly, anything that would give him an advantage when the two belligerents would clash on the battlefield; if man wanted to compel his enemy to do his will, then man would have to stand athwart his enemy in order to take his enemy's life.
However, to stand athwart the enemy is to risk one's own survival as well. While each improvement to weaponry enhanced one's own lethality vis-à-vis his enemy, the protagonist was still physically proximate to his antagonist and thus still vulnerable. Accordingly, man sought not only to improve the lethality of his arsenal, but also the degree to which he could minimize the risk to himself, ideally by maximizing the distance between himself and his enemy. Sharpening rocks, sticks, and metals increased a warrior's lethality, but developing slings and bows increased the space between him and his target.
In early warfare however, primitive technology constrained how much distance man could generate between himself and his opponent. Space was essentially a function of arm strength and eye-to-hand coordination; if the warrior had neither, or the opponent had effective countermeasures, then close-in physical assault remained necessary. Alternatively, if man could persuade fellow kinsmen to join, then the prospect of victory became greater.
As such, men soon coalesced into groupings which then evolved into the families and clans and tribes that eventually provided the basis for the first political units cited in the preceding discussion. As such groupings grew in size, opposing sides would resolve their conflict with an armed and violent battle on land common to both. (Clashes occurred at sea as well, but naval engagements closely resembled land combat in that ship borne forces would have physically attach and board the enemy ship in order to kill the opposing forces.
While the preceding discussion centered primarily on the singularly distinctive evolution of the state, man's pursuit of enhanced lethality and greater physical separation from his enemy featured multiple landmark innovations.
An early innovation was the pike, an extremely long wooden spear that enabled rigid formations of warriors to smash advancing enemies. Use of the pike diminished for some time after the defeat of
Armed with the longbow, protagonist forces could launch arrows at a greater distance and would inflict enough casualties on less mobile and rarely protected antagonist pike forces to degrade their ability to deflect close in attack or disperse them completely.
To guard against the arrows of the longbow, medieval warriors in the 1300s began adding plate armor pieces to their traditional mail armor. For the next three hundred years, extensive plate armor was used in virtually all major European battles, by both some infantrymen and almost all mounted troops, primarily because such armor could deflect edged weapons such as swords, knives, and lances. The armor also protected, for a time, against a new battlefield threat -- projectiles launched from primitive gunpowder-enabled firearms.
Gunpowder marked a major innovation in weaponry. Gunpowder burns rapidly and can serve as a propellant in firearms; more specifically, as an explosive, it will generate enough pressure to propel a bullet, but not enough to destroy the barrel of the pistol, rifle, or cannon. Nonetheless, armor continued to provide an effective countermeasure to early gunpowder-based firearms because the velocity and weight of the projective was low.
Early firearms like the musket were not heavily adopted by medieval armies because, in comparison to the longbow, they were heavy and inaccurate. Given their inaccuracy and long reload time, army tacticians had to deploy musket-bearing men in deep formations, from six to twelve men deep, in order to maximize firepower. After the front rank fired, it would file away to the rear to reload. Firearms only displaced the bow and pike after the introduction of the flintlock firing mechanism, which make loading muskets easier and quicker to load. By 1700, the musket featuring bayonets became standard issue for the infantrymen of the aforementioned European states.
Thereafter, the main tactic for infantry attacks was a slow measured advance, with pauses to fire volleys at enemy infantry. The aim was to break the enemy by firepower and leave the pursuit of them to the cavalry. If the defenders did not break and flee, then a bayonet charge and hand-to-hand combat remained an option. However, muskets were still relatively inaccurate because of the gap between the projectile and the barrel. Rifles offered greater accuracy because the barrel had grooves cut into the interior wall which would cause the bullet to spin as it left the barrel. Nonetheless, muskets still provided the advantage of a faster firing rate because for rifling to be effective, the bullet had to fit snugly into the barrel. Unfortunately, fouling, caused by normal firing of the weapon, would make it more and more difficult to load a bullet into a muzzle-loaded rifle.
The invention of the bullet-shaped Minié ball in the 1840s solved both major problems of muzzle-loading muskets and rifles. Rifled muskets firing the Minié ball were more accurate, had a far longer range, and could be reloaded quickly. Use of rifled muskets led to a slow decline in the use of massed formations, because these formations were too vulnerable to the accurate, long-range fires a rifle could produce. In particular, attacking troops would remain within range of the defenders for a longer period of time, and the defenders could also fire at them more quickly than before.
As a result, while 18th century belligerents would only be within range of their enemies' weapons for the period of time necessary to fire a few shots, late 19th century attackers might suffer dozens of volleys before drawing close to defenders, with correspondingly high casualty rates. Nonetheless, the use of massed attacks on fortified positions endured for some time; consequently, major wars of the late 19th and early 20th centuries generally produced very high casualty figures. The enormous amounts of war dead (and massive territorial devastation) resulting from the American Civil War and World War I are tragic testaments to this development, one attributable to man's simultaneous pursuit of greater physical separation from his enemy while maximizing his lethality.
The First World War is ignominiously remembered for the futility of trench warfare as armies stalemated across hundreds of miles of front. As the principal loser of that war,
Intoxicated by the militaristic nationalism and aggressive expansionist agenda of the governing Nazi Party,
However, as noted repeatedly, innovation spurs imitation.
The initially overwhelmed Allied coalition soon adopted German breakthroughs in tank and aerial warfare and soon proved equally capable, if not more adept. The American Army was woefully overmatched at the outset but soon mastered tank warfare, as the brilliant campaigns of General George S. Patton across western Europe demonstrated. The British Royal Air Force possessed the advantage of radar and successfully prevented the German Luftwaffe from attaining air superiority over
Fatefully, the Allies learned Nazi Germany was aggressively researching nuclear weapon technology. The Allies responded by launching an intensive effort, led principally by the
Near the end of
Nuclear weapons were used only once in a war and the Soviet-American arms race concluded peacefully, but the complementary development of nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile systems marked the extreme to which man had pursued greater lethality while maximizing his distance from the enemy. A single nuclear weapons could destroy an entire city and the intercontinental ballistic missile could deliver it thousands of miles. To wage war, the battlespace had become global.
Ironically, the pursuit only ensured mutually assured destruction and the much-feared American-Soviet nuclear war never occurred, partly because of this realization. Accordingly, after the arms race ended, the world's major powers retained their nuclear arsenals, essentially ensuring interstate war between them would become improbable.
Nonetheless, belligerent forces continue to meet on the battlefield and the impulse to achieve victory at a distance remains.
Also, as noted in the preceding discussion,
Finally, advances in remote piloting technology and robotics technology has introduced unmanned and autonomous ground, sea, and air vehicles to nations' arsenals. Remotely piloted vehicles and autonomous robots dramatically underscore the extent to which man pursues lethality while maximizing his distance from the enemy; with this capability, modern warriors can remotely maneuver vehicles, primarily aerial, to conduct strike operations against enemy forces thousands of miles away, and then immediately return to the safety of their base (or even their residential home) by exiting the operating platform.
Ultimately, for any belligerent (i.e. the
Whither The Duel?
If the Prussian theorist were alive today, he might amend his famous maxim. War will always remain a duel, but perhaps Clausewitz would acknowledge a modern day protagonist has little to no knowledge of where or who his antagonist is or how the antagonist might strike him.
The latest manifestation of man in this duel - the state - is no longer the sole (or preferred) vehicle for doing so. In the present day, alternative entities have capitalized on the state's shortcomings by demonstrating their efficacy in performing many of the functions once assumed to be the sole domain of the state -- including the safeguarding of security and the waging of war. The structural realities of the global political economy and advances in technology permit these entities to be of any scale and remain unknown. Furthermore, the duel no longer occurs on a distinct geographic battlefield, but a multi-dimensional battlespace that minimizes opportunities for retribution because the attacker can utilize tactics and/or weapons which preclude an immediate exercise of violent force in response.
Hybrid warfare attempts to simplify the debate by asserting future wars will feature a "blend of tactics", which can be addressed with a "balanced" strategy, all the while ignoring the imperative of reordering Westphalian structures to battle a post-Westphalian enemy.
In the end, a modern day protagonist like the
First, in terms of manpower, the expansion of the armed forces must continue and, in terms of the arsenal, must commence. A larger military will mitigate the inevitable demand the new post-Westphalian security environment will generate. If the post-Cold War world defied expectations for a "peace dividend," then the post-Westphalian world will necessitate an even steeper commitment. Additional manpower will increase costs, but given the efficacy of American service members in comparison to the non-performance of gold-plated weapons systems, the decision to shift resources should be straightforward.
Current major weapons platform procurement promises only numerically smaller fleets of incredibly expensive ground vehicles, aircraft, and naval vessels. Instead of purportedly state of the art weapons systems, the American military should pursue state of the market platforms, a step that would begin refurbishing and replenishing the existing inventory. Since promises of next generation quality that would compensate for quantity have proven delusional, pursuing quantity and current generation quality should be more than adequate.
Accordingly, a second priority is to re-focus military doctrine on the destruction of the enemy, whether it is state-based or non-state. Opposing sides in the conventional / counterinsurgency debate would vehemently respond the destruction of the enemy is a primary objective for them too, and justifiably so. However, traditionalists contend the attention on insurgencies is counter-productive, while reformers dismiss the probability of future conventional wars; the perspectives have merit but downplay the risk inherent with each approach.
Major interstate warfare may have become improbable in the nuclear age, but latter-day Alsace-Lorraines (e.g.
Reformers are right in that counterinsurgency should be a priority, but the recourse to an either/or stances ignores the adaptability demonstrated by the
As the latter half of the war in
In this vein, if the 2006 Lebanon War is touchstone for hybrid warfare, then
To this end, Israeli military leadership used the intervening 2006 to 2008 period to aggressively shift doctrine and training back to maneuver tactics and destruction of the enemy, away from patrolling and policing the population. Moreover, the Israeli military undertook rigorous planning and intelligence gathering against the enemy. When Hamas began launching rockets after the end of the six month ceasefire in December 2008,
In retrospect, the goals identified during Operation Cast Lead are telling – “to strike a direct and hard blow against the Hamas while increasing the deterrent strength of the IDF”. As much as
Post-Westphalian threats are indeed far more probable, but the
If such a capability had existed before the attempted bombing on December 25th, then a dedicated man-hunting force could have been utilized against Abdulmutallab, especially in light of the considerable intelligence collected prior to his boarding of Northwest Airlines Flight 253.
The 12/25 lapse and other recent breaches have demonstrated the inefficacy of multiple intelligence agencies, proliferating watch lists, and national directorates. If a newly established layer of bureaucratic management cannot effectively corral all sixteen agencies, then perhaps a thorough rationalization of the overall structure is in order. One recent proposal would consolidate existing agencies into four primary agencies: a foreign intelligence agency, a military intelligence agency, a domestic intelligence agency, and a technical data collection agency.
Rationalization should additionally entail elimination of unnecessary bureaucratic layers and legal liability protections to eradicate the risk aversion plaguing current practitioners. In 1995, the heroes behind the capture of Ramzi Yousef had to act unilaterally in order to ensure the mission’s success, but were then investigated for not following procedure. Fourteen years later, a US Army officer publicly aired how he spent hours on the phone trying to convince eleven separate Afghan, American and international forces authorities to sign off on a plan to capture a Taliban commander. Moreover, post-Westphalian enemies have already demonstrated their agility on the intelligence front. In
Skeptics of the state in decline premise will contend the non-state actor, while capable of catastrophic attacks, could never topple a state, especially one of
The American preoccupation with “finding the target” is practically a template to the nation’s vulnerabilities. Just as the American military seeks to disrupt an enemy’s command and control, so too could an enemy severely weaken the country by disrupting a sufficient number of nodes in its network-driven economy.
Since perfect security is unattainable,
Achieving resiliency however will require the American national government relinquish a large number of the non-security responsibilities and authorities assumed since the nation graduated to superpowerdom, primarily because the American national government has assumed roles requiring the extraction and expenditure of resources far in excess of what is available.
The thesis of imperial overstretch holds that great powers inevitably decline from their perch by pursuing military objectives beyond the capacity of their economic resources. Such overexertion was true in the case of the
Advocating devolution is not a call for a national security state -- devolution simply ratifies a division of labor future warfare will require.
To flourish in the post-Westphalian era, roles and responsibilities held by the American national government must devolve power to state and local governments, private enterprises, and communities. By devolving power downward, the American state will be empowering entities that can and will be more responsive to the needs and priorities of the citizenry. By rightsizing, the American national government can return attention to macro-level security issues, such as fostering greater international economic integration and deterring and defeating potentially hostile states.
The short history of post-Westphalian warfare underscores how the American state (and states in general) lag behind citizens in terms of responsiveness and resourcefulness. During the September 11th attacks, American citizens effectively used simply cellular communications to obtain situational awareness and execute the only successful counter-attack, while American military aircraft were miles away, heading in the wrong direction. The attempted bombing on
Finally, reordering American security (and corresponding resources) is imperative, as the continuing incompetence of the American government in the face of post-Westphalian threats may undermine its legitimacy.
In 2005, American college students explored hiring private military assets to prevent further atrocities in
How long before American citizens conclude the federal government’s monopoly over defense is no longer effective and some form of independent unilateral action is necessary? Better the American national government harness and direct would-be Minutemen rather than futilely attempting to restrain them and exacerbating the citizenry’s growing frustration.
Historians regularly note George Kennan, the father of containment, never meant his thesis to provide the justification for the extensive militarization
The attachment endures…
The post-Westphalia era means
Prompted by the dissatisfaction with the hybrid warfare thesis and based on the scholarship of John Boyd, Colin Gray, Martin van Crevald, Frederick Kagan, John Robb, Thomas Barnett, Peter W. Singer, and the fiction of Daniel Suarez.