From Inaugural To Farewell

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Never tiring, never yielding, never finishing, we renew that purpose today, to make our country more just and generous, to affirm the dignity of our lives and every life. This work continues. This story goes on. And an angel still rides in the whirlwind and directs this storm. [Emphasis Added]

President George W. Bush

2001 Inaugural Address

Q: Will you deliver a farewell address in this office?
PRESIDENT BUSH: Thinking about it. Thinking about it. A lot of Presidents have, and I'm giving it serious thought. ... If I give it, it's going to be trying to leave behind some lessons learned.
Steve Scully, C-SPAN

A prayer for patience is a double-edged sword. Patience may be a virtue but its proof lies in being tested. To pray for one's patience is to almost wish calamity on the individual -- otherwise, how would one know the prayer has been answered? In the same vein, one can recall President Bush's reference to Virginia statesman John Page's words to Thomas Jefferson after the signing of the Declaration of Independence. America repeatedly finds solace in an "exceptionalism" that is Providentially blessed, but must the nation endure only storms to detect and appreciate such benevolence?

When George W. Bush first spoke to the country as President, his remarks to the country were modest, infused with humility, and focused on consolidating the achievements of the preceding decade. Indeed, the "solemn pledge" Bush offered during the speech: "[working] to build a single nation of justice and opportunity," replete with "citizens, not spectators; citizens, not subjects; responsible citizens, building communities of service and a nation of character."

When President Bush spoke the above words, the storm was nothing on the scale of a rebellion against a mighty empire; the whirlwhind was 34 days of furious maneuvering in the aftermath of one of the closest elections in memory. Bush's inauguration culminated this episode in history. Beseeching the angel's benevolence on behalf of only un-ambitious goals appears deficient in hindsight.

History has its own designs -- especially when humanity is seemingly eager to declare its end. Within the year, a band of determined Islamic extremists would attack the nation and precipitate an American response against its sanctuary in Afghanistan and eventually a war on terrorism around the globe. Eight years later, weariness with the experience of war and economic upheaval indeed signal the presence of a storm, less so the hand of the angel.

Whether Bush would still assume an angel's bearing on America's course is unquestioned; he is deeply religious and considers his steadfast devotion to principle as a mark of integrity in a poll-obsessed political environment. But can the president who infamously refused to admit mistakes be prepared to offer lessons learned -- lessons learned only because his compass was wrong? Is there an opportunity for Bush to close out his turbulent presidency on a graceful note, to submit a valedictory message to the American people invoking the angel while also acknowledging his own hand in the storm currently besetting the country?


Unremarkable presidencies rarely close their terms with memorable farewell statements. Historians do not remind the public to heed the final words of Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan or Herbert Hoover. The honor seemingly goes to those who earned a second term, but also did not upend the nation as a result either.

Prior to American superpowerdom, the landmark Farewell Address belonged to the first president, George Washington, who warned the young republic against unduly intimate relations with European nations. In modern American history, more frequent speechmaking (and more importantly television) drew greater attention to the event. While not all administrations have been failures, nor have there been many successful two-term presidencies. In this regard, the most significant remains that of President Dwight Eisenhower, who used his Farewell Address in 1961 to highlight the hazard presented by the rising "military-industrial complex."

President Ronald Reagan underscored his trademark humility when he stated "I wasn't a great communicator, but I communicated great things" in 1989. Of all the modern two-term presidencies, Reagan was unique in that he was bequeathing the office to a preferred successor, so warnings and admonitions were hardly necessary. Nonetheless, Reagan restated the criticality of "first principles" and returned to the "shining city on a hill" that remained his metaphorical lodestar throughout his life.

In contrast, President Bill Clinton couldn't resist trumpeting his administration's accomplishments as his own during the 2001 Address. Where Reagan's constant refrain was what "we" accomplished, Clinton centered the speech on "I", ultimately congratulating himself with "I'm very grateful to be able to turn over the reins of leadership to a new President with America in such a strong position to meet the challenges of the future."

Where do these examples leave Bush? Listening to current commentary, one is convinced Bush is beyond unremarkable, but is in fact a "failed presidency," and thus the right to a farewell has been forfeited. (The constant depiction as "failed" almost conjures the dread attached to the growing international problem of "failed states," where the worst scourges of humanity simply fester and threaten global stability. Castigation as "failed presidency" may be too harsh.)

Undoubtedly, Bush has failed to achieve his most ambitious objectives and his second term was marred by galling incompetence and daunting setbacks, but the Republic has not been endangered by his administration's tenure -- despite what the rabid left spouts on the airwaves and the Web. Historians will ultimately judge whether President Bush was without achievement (and, of course, later revise this judgment, and then reverse course again...).


Mr. Scully mentioned President Eisenhower's address and President Bush conceded he hadn't conceived of a farewell in terms of a warning. As such, a possibility Bush discussed was warning against a recourse to isolationism and protectionism, commenting "the world needs our presence." While the caveat against these regressive "isms" would be merited, it might be dismissed as bankrupt given the current consensus that Bush's missteps have only fueled the impetus for their resurgence. While Bush has justifiable defenses against being blamed for the overall state of American diplomatic and economic affairs, he is the President and must acknowledge his responsibility if such a warning was to have potency.

Again, acknowledging the angel in the whirlwind may be the appropriate formula. And his repeated profession of best wishes for the incoming Obama Administration might provide the foundation.

To speculate, perhaps Bush can thank the angel for sparing the nation another vicious terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11 -- despite the determined efforts of Al-Qaeda and because of immeasurable sacrifices made by American men and women in uniform and in public service. Perhaps Bush can lament the storm unleashed by his ill-executed war in Iraq, taking responsibility for the 4,221 American dead in Iraq, while highlighting the exceptional work achieved by Gen. David Petraeus and American forces in pacifying Iraq.

Perhaps, Bush could then submit a caveat to the American people reflecting not challenges on the horizon, but experiences from the recent past in the course of presiding over the country during the above events.

Bush is deemed a failure now, but he was re-elected in decisive fashion only four short years ago. Three percentage points is not decisive, but garnering sixteen million new voters over the previous outing to win by three million is. Moreover, the invective on the opposition's side was remarkably personal and vicious -- recall haughty Democratic John Kerry musing out loud, "I can't believe I'm losing to this idiot". The Bush presidency was indeed contentious and great debates raged, but the shrill hysterics (on both sides) was poisonous.

Ultimately, Bush could warn against the continued recourse to politics of personal destruction which he endured, imploring fellow citizens to preserve the elation experienced on Election Night as well as the pride certain to be enjoyed on Inauguration Day. The call would not necessarily be original; Clinton would have been justified in denouncing such partisanship if he hadn't been so keen on perpetuating the lie he told to the American people for over a year.

Repeatedly, Bush has emphasized his sincerity in hoping for Barack Obama's success, despite a political agenda directly at odds with his own. Evidence can be seen in what has been universally applauded as a genuine attempt to facilitate the transition.

A pointed appeal for a more civil political climate -- one Obama's cool demeanor has already earned -- could provide a graceful close to an administration that has had a tumultuous second term.

E-Ring Openings -- Democrats Need Not Apply

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"Mr. Obama reached deeper into the Washington establishment — but in a bipartisan way — and asked Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to stay on..."

December 1, 2008

Mr. Obama’s Team

The New York Times

The New York Times praise for President-Elect Obama’s national security team may be protesting too much. After weeks of speculation, President-Elect has succeeding in persuading a once recalcitrant Robert Gates to stay on as secretary of defense. Retaining Gates had been the advice of many observers and accomplishing this is heralded as a positive sign for future national security policymaking going forward. However, the move is not so much bipartisan as much as it adds to the notion that defense and national security is indeed partisan, specifically Republican, territory. If Gates departs as planned within one year of Obama’s inauguration, no Democrat will have served as secretary of defense since January 1997, when Republican William Cohen assumed the post in President Bill Clinton’s Cabinet during his second term.

In the past fifty-six years, Republicans have held the secretary of defense post for almost forty-seven of them (DATA SET). Since 1969 and rise of the GOP as the dominant political party, Republicans have held the secretary of defense post for almost thirty-two years – nearly four years longer than they held the presidency. It must be very frustrating to sit on that Democratic defense team bench.

While tracing back to 1953 amplifies the dominance of Republicans in the post, selecting the year 1969 is a more appropriate demarcation because the year denotes when serious divisions over defense matters emerged as the Cold War bipartisan consensus on foreign policy fell apart.

When the Department of Defense was established as part of the National Security Act of 19471, the step was taken as a universal recognition that existing US institutions needed to be modernized if the nation was lead the free world in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. In combination with the Marshall Plan, aid to anti-communist governments in Greece and Turkey, the establishment of the Atlantic Alliance, the Act comprised a key component of bipartisan efforts to organize the US government for its role as a superpower.

To secure these achievements, Democratic President Harry S. Truman worked closely with Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. While Vandenberg had been a staunch foe of Democratic domestic programs and had originally espoused isolationism, he became a stalwart internationalist and provided critical partisan support to Truman’s efforts at a time when sizable Republican opposition to involvement overseas still existed. From then on, bipartisanship on foreign affairs became the norm. Political leaders in both parties routinely supported the principles of anti-Soviet containment and continuity was achieved in the presidency, even when it changed party hands.

However, by the late 1960s, cracks in the consensus began to emerge. The Republican Party had succeeded in marginalizing isolationists and extremists like the Birchers, but conservatives exemplified by Sen. Barry Goldwater assumed control of the party and championed a more nationalistic and aggressive posture vis-à-vis the communist bloc. In the 1964 campaign, Goldwater criticized the Democratic Johnson Administration policy in Southeast Asia for its lack of purpose, but the caricature of him as a warmonger undermined his critique. Nevertheless, a continuing theme of conservative Republican campaigns would be the need for a strong defense.

In 1968, the Democratic Party split over the Vietnam War and eventually evolved in the opposite direction. During the primaries, Sen. Robert F. Kennedy had rallied liberals and antiwar factions and was poised to win the nomination. However, his tragic assassination prevented this outcome and the subsequent convention turmoil only showcased the increasingly bitter divisions within the party. Eventual nominee, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, attempted to straddle the pro- and anti-war factions, but the images of the riots at the Chicago Convention and the defection of George Wallace Democrats resulted in a victory for Republican Richard Nixon.

The bitterness on the part of liberal and antiwar activists spurred them to liberalize party primary rules. Vehemently opposed to Nixon’s continuation of the war in Southeast Asia, liberals rallied to antiwar nominee Sen. George McGovern and promised a more accommodationist foreign policy. McGovern lost in a massive landslide but the liberal sentiment endured in the 1976 Democratic primary race. In that primary race, staunch anti-communist and pro-defense Sen. Henry “Scoop” Jackson failed to make any headway against Georgia Gov. Jimmy Carter, who promised a foreign policy based on support for human rights and later famously concluded America had been freed of its “inordinate fear of communism.”

During Carter’s presidency and the coinciding debacles in Afghanistan and Iran, leading foreign policy and national security thinkers in the party began their migration to the Republican Party, becoming the famous “neo-conservatives” who used their estimable intellectual firepower to skewer Democratic policies and support Republican alternatives. The consequence was a Democratic Party that was home to liberal thinking on foreign policy and defense matters -- favoring the accommodation of the Soviet Union, lower defense expenditures, and reduction in aid to anti-communist movements around the world. Following Republican Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980, the GOP held onto the presidency (and thus the secretary of defense post) for the next twelve years, until the end of the Cold War in 1991.

This long tenure further undermined the credibility of the Democratic Party on foreign policy and defense matters. At the same time, the period bolstered the hands-on experience of conservatives working on military affairs while diminishing that of liberals. Furthermore, with a close working relationship came greater political affinity. This connection became more pronounced after George H.W. Bush, who presided over the enormously successful Persian Gulf War, was succeeded by Bill Clinton, who had dodged the draft and had infamously terrible relations with the military.

President Clinton committed a major misstep at the outset with his position on homosexuals in the military. After that episode, his choice for secretary of defense, former House Armed Services Committee chairman Les Aspin, well-versed but disorganized, proved to be a poor fit to oversee a military undergoing a tremendous down from Cold War levels. Aspin had a short tenure and was succeeded by the capable but unremarkable William Perry. Upon winning re-election, President Clinton turned to Republican William Cohen, also knowledgeable but not necessarily an expert in military affairs.

By 2000, US military members were widely perceived as favoring the Republican Party, an affiliation which only grew. According to Peter Holm, a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin Madison, the gap between service-members who identified with the Republican and Democratic Party varied during the course of the Bush Administration, but by the end of 2007, the weighted results found Republicans making up 44% of the military population, as compared to 17% calling themselves Democrats. Even after the setbacks in Iraq, considerable support for Republicans remained in the military; the 2008 Military Times newspaper polls indicated 68% of currently serving military respondents favored John McCain for president, while only 23% supported for Barack Obama.

A key argument for Obama to retain Gates center on the continuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; accordingly, because of these demands, Obama should keep Gates to ensure continuity.

However, the need for stability in the post amidst war is not imperative. When the White House changed hands in 1969, the Vietnam War continued to rage and Nixon's selection, Melvin Laird, ably stepped in after LBJ's Clark Clifford and accomplished a great deal.

Laird’s main achievements include disengagement from Vietnam, reviving civil-military relations, and sustaining readiness during the trauma of Vietnam. Furthermore, one key accomplishment resonates to this day – the establishment of the all-volunteer force and coinciding decisions as to how the nation would mobilize for war.

The experience of the Vietnam War led decision-makers to end the draft and move to an all-volunteer force. Equally important, decision-makers concurred with recommendations to utilize the reserves rather than draft civilians. The shift constituted the first step toward established the “operational reserve.” While reliance on volunteers and the reserve would ensure higher quality service-members and enhanced readiness, Laird’s total force concept also meant decision-makers would have to exercise greater care when making the decision to launch a war, since any large military undertaking would require substantial reserve contributions, especially after the post-Cold War drawdown.

Accordingly, the drawn out experience in Iraq placed attention on the manner in which the Bush Administration utilized the armed forces, specifically the reserves. Consequently, considerable attention is now being placed on reforming mobilization statues and regulations, the appropriate size and constitution of the active force, and the kind of warfare the US military should be prepared to fight.

Secretary Gates will be invariably hedged in by other Democratic appointees (indeed long-serving Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England has already announced his intent to resign in January) and succeeded by an estimable Democrat, such as former secretary of the navy Richard Danzig, but his retention underscores the dearth of credibility on the part of Democrats in the field of defense, even after Bush-Rumsfeld.

Of course, voters did elect Barack Obama, a former community organizer with no exposure to the military whatsoever, over John McCain, a Vietnam War hero and respected voice on national security affairs, so…


1 The Department of Defense was originally titled the National Military Establishment (NME); the name was changed when the Act was amended in 1949.


Wikipedia; United States Secretary of Defense

Department of Defense, “Histories of the Secretaries of Defense

Recommended Reading:

SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense by Charles A. Stevenson

A Generational Realignment Too

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When President-Elect Barack Obama opened his candidacy on the steps of the Illinois Statehouse, he was explicit. Forty-five years old and less than 600 days being born into the Baby Boom generation1, Obama identified the 2008 election as a moment for his generation – Generation X. To contrast himself with prevailing Establishment figures and the currently frontrunning candidates, Obama pointedly declared, “Each and every time, a new generation has risen up and done what’s needed to be done. Today we are called once more, and it is time for our generation to answer that call.” Obama employed the word generation twelve more times during the speech. Moreover, in true Gen X fashion, the declaration was eventually simplified; generational turnover simply became Change and Yes We Can. Contrast the mantra’s brevity and Gen X “just do it” vibe with Hillary Clinton’s (i.e. the Baby Boom’s) cumbersome expositions as slogans (“Big Challenges, Real Solutions: Time to Pick a President,” “Working for Change, Working for You,” or “Ready For Change, Ready To Lead”). With the election now over and debate underway as to whether the Democratic sweep signals a new electoral alignment, attention of this generation’s ascension is merited.

In Neil Howe and William Strauss’s exceptional book, 13th Gen : Abort, Retry, Ignore, Fail?, Generation X is defined as the eighty million individuals born between 1961 and 1981. Arriving in the wake of the vainglorious Baby Boom generation, this cohort would be denounced as apathetic, slackers, and destined to undermine the American Republic. Author Douglas Coupland provided the non-label label of “Generation X” for his contemporaries almost as an purposely ambiguous disassociation from the self-indulgent Boomers. Derided by the Boomers as unworthy heirs of American prosperity and power, Generation X was merely an updated, albeit more cynical, alienated, and violent variant of the 1920s Lost Generation. Quoting historian David Hackett Fisher (who was describing yet another disdained generation), Howe and Strauss noted Generation X had the “unhappy fate… to be young in an era when age was respected, and old in a time when youth took the palm.” More succinctly, Generation X had a PR problem.

Damned if it did (which could only entail striving to undo the damage wreaked by Boomers) and damned if it didn’t (a seemingly reasonable course after experiencing the aftermath of many ill-fated Boomer crusades), Generation Xers had to adapt, ultimately making virtues out of their ironic detachment, their flexibility, and their cunning.

Attempting to decipher the future of this 13th Generation, Howe and Strauss catalogued the circumstances that colored their youth –chaotic individualism; social and familial fragmentation; cultural permissiveness; overly complex institutions; excessive consumption mortgaging the future; and politics featuring endless debates without resolution – looking for clues. While this was not a recipe for a bright future, Howe and Strauss contended the evolution of previously disregarded generations would be a better predictor of Generation X’s future.

As such, the Lost Generation roared during the Twenties, but its political and cultural touchstones were Dwight Eisenhower and Norman Rockwell, embodiments of Fifties tranquility and conformity. In the same way, Generation X also possessed the potential for maturation and transformation.

Among Howe and Strauss’s predictions:

As mature leaders and voters, 13ers will favor investment over consumption, endowments over entitlements, the needs of the very young over the needs of the very old. (PG 224)

A whole generation has now grown up knowing the imperative of setting aside for retirement via 401K accounts as well as the burden that is massive college debt. Accordingly, Gen Xers embrace self-directed retirement account planning and easy to fund College 529 accounts for their children. The free market may be unforgiving but this generation recognizes it is the best game in town, especially in comparison to low interest Treasury yields or redistribution schemes beneficial only to preceding or succeeding generations. The proof can be found in virtually other regions of the world. While Boomers directed decades of foreign aid and condoned socialist ventures only to achieve little, the lives of hundreds of millions of Asians have been revolutionized in a single generation by foreign direct investment.

Thirteeners will make caustic, independent, yet self-effacing elders. (PG 224)

Finally supplanting Boomers, Generation Xers will similarly be quickly deposed by the succeeding Millenial Generation. Generation X bore the brunt of the 1991 Recession and then labored to build the modern Internet economy – only to crash when the dot-com boom went bust and THEN AGAIN after the scramble during the housing bubble. This important period of risk-taking and hustle will be remembered casually as mere hype, speculation, and greed, but it did provide the foundation for more successful “Web 2.0” ventures and financial and credit market modernization.

In the end, Gen X elders, readily pushed aside by the young, will be content with simply knowing their labors afforded their heirs the prosperity they are now seizing. Already the Millenials are claiming credit for Obama’s breakthrough Facebook campaign, touting lopsided majorities in their age bracket compared to others, all the while declining to acknowledge their participation rates barely exceeded previous elections and to do that, all they had to do was just show up.

For the more intriguingly prescient forecasts, consider the following:

Over the next fifteen years [1993-2008], the festering quarrel between 13ers and Boomers will grow into America’s next great “generation gap.” (PG 217)

In his 2006 memoir, "The Audacity of Hope," Obama memorably wrote, "In the back and forth between Clinton and Gingrich, and in the elections of 2000 and 2004, I sometimes felt as if I were watching the psychodrama of the Baby Boom generation — a tale rooted in old grudges and revenge plots hatched on a handful of college campuses long ago — played out on the national stage."

More famously, Obama heralded conservative icon Ronald Reagan (the defining political figure for 13ers) for “chang[ing] the trajectory of America,” while lumping Bill Clinton with Richard Nixon in their failures to accomplish the same. The remarkable dismissal of the last Democratic president (who happened to be the husband of his biggest rival) was either coldly calculated or purely accidental – only Obama knows. But Obama did express Gen X sentiments by concluding,

I think they felt like with all the excesses of the 1960s and 1970s and government had grown and grown but there wasn't much sense of accountability in terms of how it was operating. I think people, he just tapped into what people were already feeling, which was we want clarity we want optimism, we want a return to that sense of dynamism and entrepreneurship that had been missing.

The contemplative respect offered for a conservative hero by the nation’s most liberal Senator is demonstrative of the 13er contrarian ethos as well as the most forthright, but probably most controversial, prediction of all:

Throughout their lives, 13ers will be America’s most politically conservative generation since the Lost. … Regardless of party or ideology, 13ers will be drawn to candidates who avoid hype, do what it takes to get the job done, and shed no tears. (Emphasis added) (PG 222)

Howe and Strauss can be forgiven for incorrectly predicting a conservative-voting generation way back in 1993, before the impeachment fiasco, before the long hard slog in Iraq, and before the catastrophe that was Hurricane Katrina. President-elect Obama just received 66.9 million votes and a stridently liberal Democratic Party just swept both houses of Congress, so forecasts for a conservative Generation X are way off, right?

Not necessarily. Note, Howe and Strauss predicted 13ers would favor small “c” conservatism of the libertarian and laissez faire variety, not the prevailing Conservative Republican template then becoming increasingly dogmatic on social issues. Is there any evidence to show 13ers are leaning this way? Perhaps.

First, during the Republican primaries, the horse race between McCain, Huckabee, and Romney may have provided the most headlines, but the energy and fury was greatest on their libertarian flank. Ron Paul galvanized an entire generation of young libertarians ready to offer unorthodox perspectives on many issues, including current account deficits, entitlement obligations, monetary supply, and imperially-minded foreign policy. Between online “money bombs” and thousands of YouTube videos (approximately 188,000 as of 11/30/08), libertarian stalwart Ron Paul, ironically, one of the older candidates to run in 2008, captured the affection of many Generation X and Millenial voters.

Second, the most significant congressional vote of the year was the first House vote on the financial bailout. The proposed bailout was defeated 228 to 205 and subsequently, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped over 777 points in a single day, the largest single-day point drop ever, a loss of approximately $1.2 trillion. Conservative Republican opposition was blamed for the defeat and market swoon, even though 95 Democrats also voted against the bailout. Nonetheless, an examination of the House demographics shows that conservative 13ers came down more decisively against the bailout.

In the Democratic and Republican conferences, the percentage of Gen Xers (DATA SET 1, 2) is nearly equal2. Within the conferences, the Democratic and Republican voting percentages for and against the bailout were 59-41 and 33-67. In contrast, 64% of Gen X Democratic congressmen supported the bailout, whereas the opposition of 13er Republicans exceeded the average – 74%. As Eve Fairbanks, congressional correspondent to The New Republic, has pointed out, this contingent of opposition votes heralds the rising new guard in the Republican party – defiantly conservative, ideologically committed, and enthusiastically uncompromising.

For all the commentary of the youth vote going for Obama, there is substantial opening for a libertarian message among Generation X and the Millenials.

The Bottom Line Generation

Howe and Strauss predict 13er conservatism will be assured if remaining Boomers launch one last national crusade on liberal terms.

President-Elect Obama has signaled positive steps such as budget cutting and tax reductions, but they are paired with new government initiatives to establish universal health care, redistribute income, and mandate new directions in the energy sector. Having seen such undertakings before, Gen Xers are likely to prefer less sweeping change, preferring measures that will “simplify the complex, narrow the bloated, and eliminate the unworkable.” To borrow Michael Lind’s analytic framework3, the Hamiltonian ambitions of the Obama Administration may spur a Jeffersonian backlash among Generation Xers.

Ultimately, Generation X is as Howe and Strauss repeatedly describes them -- the bottom-line generation. 13ers will never surpass the “greatest generation” or outshine the “me generation”; the destiny of Generation X is survival, self-preservation, and handing the world off to the next generation better than it was bequeathed to them. No more symbols, no more iconography, no more hagiography, just attention to the task at hand. As Ms. Sitafa Harden, an Atlanta-based blogger, wrote,

If scarcity was a virtue, then Generation Xers would be its patron saints. We did everything we were supposed to do---we went to college, bought houses, invested in our 401Ks… The bottom line is that we are survivors, creative thinkers, mediators, translucent butterflies transforming ourselves into whatever new and, at times, frightening situations may present themselves.

Advice to President-Elect Obama, heed words from early on in your campaign when you first offered generational change:

I'm a Democrat. I'm considered a progressive Democrat. But if a Republican or a conservative or a libertarian or a free-marketer has a better idea, I am happy to steal ideas from anybody, and in that sense I'm agnostic.


1 Generation X is defined as the American population born between 1961 and 1981. (link)

2 Around 13 %, an amusing coincidence.

3 See Michael Lind’s “Obama And The Dawn Of The Fourth Republic.”

For further reading, see Neil Howe and William Strauss, 13th Gen : Abort, Retry, Ignore, Fail? April 1993

Realignment Ruminations

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In political science, an electoral realignment is the equivalent of a NFL Super Bowl dynasty. Historians recount landslides by the dominant party and chronicle how the subordinate party struggled to stay competitive. Of course, an NFL dynasty or electoral realignment is not evident until it nears its conclusion, but this does not prevent speculation as to whether one has occurred. With a decisive victory by President-Elect Barack Obama and the Democratic Party on November 4th, several observers, some reasonably and some unreasonably, are concluding a political realignment is underway. Only four years ago, a “permanent Republican majority” was seemingly heralded by a seventh victory in the past ten presidential elections and expanded congressional majorities. Given the rapid turn of events, is a declaration of a realignment in favor of the Democratic Party merited? As a very preliminary conclusion, yes. The Democratic victory last Tuesday is the most recent manifestation of various historical, institutional, and political forces that have shaped the modern American electoral environment.1

As John Judis aptly notes in “America The Liberal,” “Realignments are not scientifically predictable events like lunar eclipses, but they have occurred with some regularity over last two hundred years--in 1828, 1860, 1896, 1932, and 1980.” Moreover, Judis acknowledges not all realignments are the same, describing some as either “soft” or “hard”. A hard realignment reflects comprehensive domination of the presidency and Congress by one party, such as after 1896 by the Republicans or 1932 by the Democrats. Alternatively, a soft realignment similarly features a dominant party, but continued competitiveness on the part of the other party; an example is the general Republican dominance of American politics since 1980.

Republicans generally won the presidency or Congress in decisive fashion thereafter only to be denied comprehensive control by a still competitive but weaker Democratic Party. Because the Republican Party never fully dominated this period, Judis concludes the recent election simply validated the thesis of The Emerging Democratic Majority, (a book he authored with Ruy Teixeira), which generally predicted (it was published in 2002 just before the Republicans recaptured Congress and the Bush Administration won re-election in 2004) the voting majority Obama received. As such, Judis argues the depiction of America as “center-right” is incorrect and President-Elect Obama should interpret the election as a mandate for a liberal agenda.

Judis is correct up to a point. The Democratic victory in 2008 is indeed the beginning of a realignment, but is far more reflective of trends preceding the socio-economic composition of the majority he and Teixeira presciently identified.

A more insightful interpretation of the Democratic victory this year can be found in Michael Lind’s “Obama And The Dawn Of The Fourth Republic.” Lind examines the 2008 election results within the long 200 plus year continuum of American history and the coinciding debates over the role of government. According to Lind, landmark elections like 1860 and 1932 signal the advent of a new “republic,” whereby the content of American politics shifts to new priorities.

During these periods, the two original foundations for exercising governmental power, Hamiltonian centralization and Jeffersonian decentralization, continue their struggle to shape the nation’s future. Conveniently enough, these seventy-two year periods can be split in half whereby the Hamiltonian impulse can be observed in the first thirty-two years, while the Jeffersonian response can be identified in the second thirty-two years.

Accordingly, Judis’s soft realignment in 1980 is more appropriately seen within the continuum of the “Third American Republic” between 1932 and 2004. This period opened with the strong Hamiltonian agenda of FDR’s New Deal only to ebb in 1968, when the liberal Democratic coalition collapsed in the face of robust Republican conservative coalition that would dominate politics with a Jeffersonian message until 2004. Since the seventy-two year period is a framework and not a hard template, Lind characterizes Bush’s re-election in 2004 as a “fluke,” a judgment increasingly merited after observing the successive routs the Republicans have experienced in 2006 and 2008.

Lind argues the recurring cycles reflect the influence of economic development and technological changes, but additionally acknowledges “the broad outlines of technological and economic change merely provide the frame for the picture; the details depend on the groups that emerge victorious in political battles.”

In this regard, identifying the historical and institutional sources influencing the electoral prospects for contemporary ideological positions becomes important.

Before There Was A United States

In the same fashion as Lind’s analysis, the sources of American political realignments are derived from debates that date to the founding of the nation. Concurrent with the Hamiltonian-Jeffersonian debate were questions as to how potentially destructive factionalism would be prevented and what role America would have on the international stage.

With the ratification of the Constitution, America famously enshrined the principle of “separation of powers,” whereby the three branches of government would function as equals, checking and balancing against the others.

In designing an elected executive, the Founding Fathers rejected the establishment of a monarchy in favor of a republic. Moreover, America’s first President, George Washington, warned against “entangling alliances” and excessive in overseas affairs. While some historians depict Washington’s counsel as the basis for isolationism, the warning really underscored America’s desire for “insulation” from foreign affairs as conducted by power-politics driven Europe. America would indeed be ambitious on the North American continent, but generally sought to distinguish the nation’s virtuous republican character free of the imperial traditions associated with its former colonizer and the other European great powers.

Occasional Lapses, Enduring Consequences

While the “separation of powers” and “a republic, not an empire” are fundamental principles, the course of American history has been affected by the episodic deviation from them. When these deviations have occurred, the justification has usually been an emergency. While the question of national emergencies confounded the Founding Fathers, they found an answer in the writings of the Enlightenment thinker John Locke.

In Second Treatise of Government, Locke defined a “law of self-preservation” whereby an executive could employ extraordinary powers when an emergency existed. The rationale acknowledged an executive could move swiftly, as legislatures could not. Extraordinary actions could then be justified by the legislature's and public's subsequent concurrence that an emergency existed.

The Founding Fathers made no provision for such an emergency prerogative, but they did agree on the need for executive initiative and extraordinary actions to safeguard the nation. However, there were two corollaries -- one, the executive does so at his or her own volition, and two, he or she must report to the Congress at once.

In the seventy-two years leading up the Civil War, invocation of an emergency occurred numerous times – Jefferson in 1803 with the Louisiana Purchase, Tyler in 1845 regarding the annexation of Texas, and Polk in 1846 at the outset of the American-Mexican War. In each case, the unprecedented exercise of executive power was controversial but justified as necessary in the face of emergency circumstances and subsequently endorsed by the Congress.

In 1861, however, the emergency prerogative took on new dimensions. To preclude the gravest threat to self-preservation, President Lincoln postponed the opening of Congress, assembled militia, expanded the military forces, suspended habeas corpus, and ordered a naval blockade of the Confederacy. Most famously of all, Lincoln unilaterally issued the Emancipation Proclamation. Opponents argued Lincoln was behaving like a tyrant, but he responded the actions were justified in surviving to the greatest emergency the nation would ever face -- dismemberment. Unfortunately, in his eager pursuit of national preservation, Lincoln’s justifications would have consequences in the future.

Lincoln's reinterpretation ratified the prerogative as an engagement of the Constitution's “war power;” moreover, Lincoln placed the “war power” in the office of the Presidency. As the executive branch also contained the office of the Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln made military command equivalent to presidential initiative, establishing the concept of a “military presidency”. Lincoln's innovations would have implications in the next century when America finally emerged as a world power.

Becoming a World Superpower -- The Vital Center and Its Collapse

After the Civil War, American politics again concentrated on domestic matters. As before the Civil War, the primary political issues concerned the economy.2 While the American victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898 signaled the emergence of America as a world power, the nation refrained from becoming an aggressive imperial nation. More importantly, participation in the world’s first world war did not revive Lincoln’s military presidency or imbalances in favor of the executive branch.

After 1860, the Republican Party dominated. The discredited pro-slavery Democratic Party stood by as Republicans nationalized the banking system, enacted protectionist tariffs, and subsidized railroad construction across the continent. This domination continued and adjusted when a successor Republican coalition crafted in 1896 by William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt sought to redress the imbalance of a government acting in concert with industry. The Republican split in 1912 permitted a brief Democratic interregnum under Woodrow Wilson, but in 1920 avowedly laissez faire conservative Republicans returned and dominated American politics for the Roaring Twenties. Then came the stock market crash and the Great Depression. Hoover scrambled to change course and introduced government intervention in the economy but it was not enough to save the Republican Party.

In 1932, voters provided FDR and the New Deal a massive mandate, a undeniable political realignment in favor of the Democratic Party. However, the critical factor in sealing the enduring dominance of the New Deal coalition was the event of America's involvement from 1941 to 1945 in the Second World War and its assumption of global leadership the subsequent Cold War.

While FDR’s New Deal was enormously popular and provided the basis for a sizable coalition, it did not revive the depressed American economy and it is uncertain whether the voting majority would have held without the advent of the Second World War in 1939. Assuming the role of Commander-in-Chief revived the Lincoln precedent of the military president and transformed FDR into an indispensable political figure. Separately, the war rescued the reputation of the New Deal as the corresponding economic stimulus ultimately revived the economy – and seemingly validated government management of the economy.

FDR remained in office, winning two more terms; the Republican Party inched back but essentially echoed the liberal agenda. FDR’s successor, Harry Truman, continued New Deal policies as part of his Fair Deal and rejected a retreat from global affairs, positioning the United States as leader of the free world and counterweight to the Soviet Union in the Cold War.

The cumulative effect was the elevation of the executive branch vis-à-vis the Congress for the duration of the Cold War and the ascendancy of the liberal anti-communist consensus that shaped both the post-war Democratic and Republican Party outlooks. The Cold War presidency was Lincoln’s military presidency renewed and subsequent Democratic Congresses protected the principles of the liberal New Deal.

This consensus, famously labeled the Vital Center by historian Arthur Schlesinger, encapsulated agreement by the two parties on the major issues of the day – government involvement in the economy and bipartisanship in support of anti-communist activism abroad.

The height of the Vital Center consensus was best typified by the 1960 presidential contest. Republican nominee Richard Nixon and Democratic standard-bearer John F. Kennedy were virtually indistinguishable and the resulting vote was one of the closest in American history.

While seemingly indicative of near unanimity across the body politic, the truth was an increasingly fragile consensus. Bipartisanship was laudable but necessitated a political quid pro quo necessary to maintain unity. Concessions, necessary for cooperation, diluted innovation in the domestic sphere; a sluggish economy, cultural conformity, the dearth of reform or progress on civil rights were stark reminders. In this formulation, if Vital Center politics and bipartisanship produced a failure, then the result would be enormous strain on partisan consensus and inevitably, political instability.

Ideological cracks were already emerging too. In 1955, William F. Buckley declared the intention of conservatives to stand athwart history and yell “Stop!” In 1962, liberals issued the Port Huron Statement, a manifesto for strident progressive reform. As E.J. Dionne succinctly noted, they had the same enemy -- “The New Left despised ‘Establishment liberals.’ The right hated ‘the liberal Establishment.’”

The conservative revolt succeeded first. In 1964, conservatives seized control of the Republican Party and nominated their champion, Sen. Barry Goldwater. The Goldwater candidacy lost in a Democratic landslide, but the Republican Party was firmly in the hands of a conservative majority that endorsed anti-communism and nationalism in foreign affairs, traditionalism in social issues, and the free market in economic doctrine.

In the next election, the Democratic Party split over the Vietnam War. Antiwar liberals and social progressives coalesced around Senator Robert F. Kennedy, but his tragic assassination left them leaderless. The party regulars assured the selection of Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, who subsequently lost the election. With this defeat, liberal insurgents seized the opportunity to establish themselves in the Democratic Party.

In 1972, liberals won control of the Democratic Party and nominated Sen. George S. McGovern, a recognized leader of antiwar and progressive forces. McGovern similarly lost in a Republican landslide, but the Democratic Party was now home to liberalism that sanctioned détente and accommodation in foreign policy, progressivism in social issues, and welfare activism in economic doctrine.

The Voters Respond with “Cross-Cutting” Majorities

Given the ideological polarization of the two political parties, a conflict was inevitable – subsequent political debates featured détente vs. anti-communism in foreign policy, and progressivism vs. traditionalism in social issues, free market vs. welfare activism in economic doctrine. While the Republican conservative and Democratic liberal elites took pride in their ideological consistency, the voters generally retained their preference for an anti-communist foreign policy and liberal domestic policies.

Thus the voting majorities of the public did not coincide with the ideological framework within each party. Conservative majorities in foreign policy and social issues were well received by the public, whereas free market doctrine was not. Liberal majorities for welfare activism proved popular while détente foreign policy and progressive social stands were rejected.

Moreover, institutional biases were at play. The executive branch was the locus of military command and foreign policy direction, an outgrowth of Lincoln's military presidency, FDR’s example during the Second World War, and the subsequent demands of the Cold War. Furthermore, the president was more visible on cultural issues as he came to symbolize “moral leadership.” The legislative branch was at the forefront of questions of economic doctrine. Congress established and perpetuated the popular entitlement programs initiated by FDR and further expanded by Lyndon Johnson.

The result was “cross-cutting majorities” – public preference for an anti-communist foreign policy, traditional social stands, and a welfare-oriented economy led to Republican and Democratic domination of the executive and legislative branches, respectively. Electing a Republican president and a Democratic Congress was routine and characterized the general makeup of the American government from 1968 to 1992.

These circumstances explain why Richard Nixon’s massive 1972 landslide did not translate into a corresponding congressional takeover or why the gains of the vaunted Reagan Revolution in 1980 were ultimately limited. Reagan brought in a Republican Senate as well but the House remained firmly in Democratic hands. The House had been so since 1954 and would remain until Newt Gingrich’s Republican Revolution of 1994.

The reversal of both parties’ fortunes between 1992 and 1994 similarly validates the existence of cross-cutting majorities. During these two election cycles, each of the aforementioned main issues featured major changes that produced corresponding reactions in voter preferences.

With the end of the Cold War, conservatives lost their advantage on foreign policy and voters concluded international conditions were safe to embark on a more accommodationist foreign policy. Moreover, the Recession of 1990 to 1991 led to new expectations of the executive branch, by providing a rationale for a future welfare-activist majority in the presidency. In the next election, welfare-activist proposals by the Democratic candidate would win over the national middle class voting public and begin a Democratic hold on the presidency. However, the inability of the Congress to provide economic innovation or relief, coupled with overly expansive plans to take over health care on the part of the new Democratic Administration helped to repudiate welfare-activist economic doctrine and bring about a free market majority, which ended Democratic dominance in Congress.

Moreover, unlike the ideological battles that transformed into institutional turf wars and assertions of constitutional infringement, the two parties achieved a substantial amount of reform. During the 1990s, the Clinton Administration and Gingrich Congress passed welfare reform, tax reductions, and balanced budgets. If not for the Monica Lewinsky scandal and resulting fury, President Clinton and Speaker were poised to conclude a landmark deal on entitlement reform, as attested to in The Pact: Bill Clinton, Newt Gingrich, and the Rivalry that Defined a Generation.

Thus, by 2000, the norm of a Republican President and Democratic Congress had been replaced by a Democratic President facing off against a Republican Congress. George W. Bush’s victory in 2000 can be seen as the Republican equivalent of Democrat Jimmy Carter’s win in 1976 – anomalies resulting from public disgust with his predecessor’s scandals. Carter only won by one-tenth of a percentage point after leading by thirty-three at one point and, as everyone well remembers, Bush did not win the popular vote.

A Brief Moment for the Vital Center-Right…

However, Carter went down to defeat but Bush won re-election, why?

Again, the shift in voting majorities for the executive branch. After the September 11th terrorist attacks, voting majorities again favored the muscular nationalist message of the Republican Party. Poll after poll cited national security as the voters’ primary concern in 2004 and the greater confidence accorded the Republican Party on this issue. Accordingly, Bush went on to win the first clear majority of the popular vote since George H.W. Bush in 1988. Moreover, Bush had campaigned for and received a Republican congressional majority in the 2002 mid-term elections, the first such first term victory since FDR in 1934.

The parallel with FDR is telling because it indicates the Bush Republican conservatism might have achieved the permanent majority status Karl Rove had planned; a Vital Center primarily of a conservative composition featuring an “ownership society” economy and bipartisanship in support of anti-terrorism activism abroad.

In the end, however, the new Republican majority collapsed just as the original Vital Center did – overreaching in a war overseas, this time in the deserts of Iraq. Coupled with the horrendous mismanagement of the economy and the incompetence displayed during the response to Hurricane Katrina, voter majorities swung heavily to the alternative.

In 2006, voters favored greater welfare-activism in economic doctrine and accommodationism abroad, leading them to eject the twelve-year old GOP congressional majorities in favor of the Democratic Party. And now in 2008, voters have soundly defeated the Republican candidate in favor a self-proclaimed change agent committed to greater government involvement in the economy and less unilateral activism overseas.

The brevity of the Republican Party’s dominance during the mid-2000s reflects the greater volatility of global affairs in the modern day.

Prior to the Second World War, American elections generally revolved around economic issues; with the transformation into a superpower, the parties’ corresponding worldview became another basis for political competition. The static bipolar nature of the Cold War precluded sudden shifts or events, but the modern globalizing world is now replete with sudden shocks and events, like terrorist attacks, financial crises, pandemics, and climate change. Coupled with the 24/7 media, the corresponding shift in voter preferences is equally volatile.

The Obama Realignment

Thus, the preceding conclusion (House of Marathon, 10/31/08, “Après McCain Les Deluge”) that President-Elect Obama is poised to dominate American politics for the next eight years and the conclusion here that his election constitutes a realignment in favor of the Democratic Party.

With Republican failures on the economy (massive deficits, the financial industry collapse) and in foreign affairs (two mismanaged wars and a diminished reputation), solid voting majorities have lined up behind the Democratic Party. The Republican Party is leaderless, wrangling over ideological principles, and ill-prepared to capitalize on any missteps.

Upon inauguration, Obama will become the center of the American political universe. With hefty congressional majorities, a fawning media, and the manner in which his plans will cement a new majority, he and the Democratic Party will be almost unbeatable, regardless of their performance.

Just like FDR.

1 This essay is an updated adaptation of Republic In Crisis: The Evolution And Climax Of Divided Government In The United States, November 1993.

2 While the tariff, trusts, and monetary policy are seemingly mundane matters, the issues spurred tremendous political activity and voter turnout was greatest during this period of American history.